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O
rganic production of fruits, vegetables, and spe-
cialty crops, while small in total volume, has been
increasing over time and is expected to continue to
grow. Many of these crops are covered by federal mar-
keting order programs with provisions and regulations
that affect marketing of the total crop, both conven-
tional and organic. Marketing orders, which are
financed by mandatory assessments on all shipments
of the covered commodity, can include provisions that
(1) regulate the volume marketed; (2) establish man-
datory minimum quality, container, and pack standards;
(3) finance generic advertising and promotion pro-
grams; and (4) sponsor production and marketing
research. Most marketing order administrative com-
mittees also collect and disseminate economic statistics
to help achieve the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act objective of orderly marketing.
Marketing orders and other government-mandated
marketing programs, including national check-offs and
California commodity commissions, have been and
continue to be challenged in court. Two legal cases
regarding First Amendment issues associated with man-
datory payments to support generic commodity
advertising have progressed to the U.S. Supreme Court
and others are wending their way through the courts.1
Mandatory support of generic advertising is the pro-
vision most often challenged, but individuals also
question the benefits of minimum quality standards
and commodity research programs. There are handlers,
with operations ranging from small to very large, who
believe that they spend more on mandatory commod-
ity assessments than they receive in benefits. Among
these are producers of organic commodities under
SUMMARY
active marketing orders who have requested exemp-
tion from mandatory assessments and marketing order
provisions.
Research on generic commodity advertising gener-
ally shows that such advertising does yield positive
returns. Alston et al. (1996), for example, estimated
that promotional activities by the California Table
Grape Commission increased U.S. per capita consump-
tion by about 1.5 pounds. Using conservative
assumptions regarding the effects of supply response
to higher demand, they estimated a marginal benefit-
cost ratio of about five to one (a $5 return on every
$1 spent). Studies of estimated returns from advertis-
ing and promotion programs for other California
commodities have examined avocados (Carman and
Craft), prunes (Alston, Carman, Chalfant, Crespi, Sex-
ton and Venner), almonds (Crespi and Sexton), eggs
(Schmit, Reberte and Kaiser), raisin exports (Kaiser and
Liu), and walnuts (Kaiser). Each of these studies found
that advertising and promotion of a product increased
demand and that program returns exceeded costs by a
significant margin.
Marketing order provisions raise issues related to
how the costs of benefits are distributed and whether
the rules and regulations are equitably applied. For
example, the impacts of a minimum-size regulation
can vary regionally because of different climate condi-
tions and production practices. Similarly, research
projects that are funded by a marketing order may
benefit some producers more than others because of
the different varieties growers produce and their indi-
vidual production practices. If there are differences in
subsets of a commodity based on different varieties
1 The effects of legal challenges to mandatory producer and handler support of commodity advertising programs are difficult to
forecast. Two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have not settled the First Amendment issues (compelled speech vs. free speech)
being raised in the litigation. In the first case, Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc. v. Espy, which involved mandatory assessments for
promotion of California nectarines, plums, and peaches, the court decided that the plaintiffs were obliged to participate in the generic
promotion program because they had voluntarily participated in the regulated market. However, United Foods successfully chal-
lenged the 1990 Mushroom Act (United Foods, Inc. v. United States) on compelled commercial speech grounds. The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the Sixth Circuit Court’s decision that the generic advertising program for mushrooms was unconstitutional. Other
cases that are being appealed to circuit courts may make it to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court finds that producers and
handlers cannot be compelled to support an industry advertising program, then many, if not all, such mandatory programs will likely
fail due to free-rider problems. If the court decides in favor of mandatory support, current programs will continue and new programs
may emerge. Crespi and Sexton (2001) and Crespi and Marette (2002) discuss some of the implications of court decisions on
commodity advertising programs.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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or product differentiation through branding or other
means, for example, advertising and promotion can
increase demand for one variety or product more than
another.
Note that problems with equitable application of
each of the provisions discussed above also can occur
when comparing organic and conventional products.2
As the organic industry continues to grow and in-
terest new customers, concerns about how
conventional and organic producers can cooperate and
co-exist under marketing order programs must be ad-
dressed. Fundamental issues concerning relevant
markets remain:
 Are organic and conventional products that are
in the same commodity category close substi-
tutes for each other in consumer markets with
similar characteristics of demand?
 Do an organic producer’s views about grades and
quality depend on the volume s/he markets?
 Does a minimum quality standard impact or-
ganic and conventional producers differently
because of product characteristics that are tied
to the method of production?
 Does a surplus in the market for a particular
commodity affect the price for organic and con-
ventionally produced commodities similarly?
 How can promotion, advertising, and production
research be structured so that both conventional
and organic producers realize similar benefits?
The goal of this study was to evaluate the strengths
and weaknesses of federal marketing order programs
from the point of view of organic producers and han-
dlers. Because of the relative “newness” and small
volume of organic production for most commodities,
a limited amount of data is available to answer these
questions. This study collects and assembles the in-
formation that is available and, in the process, identifies
deficiencies in the data.
Commodities
Federal marketing order programs for three commodi-
ties—California almonds, California kiwifruit, and
Washington-Oregon winter pears—were selected for
analysis. In all three cases:
 organic production of the commodity is well-
established and regulated by a marketing order.
 the administrative committee for each order has
established working relationships with organic
producers and handlers.
 there is disagreement among organic producers
and handlers about the costs and benefits of the
marketing order program.
 the marketing order administrator and
administrative committee are often required to
respond to issues associated with marketing
organic products.
2 Work on the distribution issues associated with marketing orders indicates that product differences can affect returns from
advertising and promotion programs. Research papers on some of these issues were presented at the NEC-63 conference on commod-
ity promotion (Washington, DC, October 2002). See papers by Alston, Freebairn and James (“Distributional Issues in Check-Off
Funded Programs”), Chung and Kaiser (“Distributional Effects of Commodity Promotion Programs by Type of Producer”), and
Crespi and Marette (“Are Equivalent Assessments for Generic Advertising Optimal if Products are Differentiated?”). The Web site
address for executive summaries is http://commodity.aem.cornell.edu/nec63/exsum_02DC.htm. Crespi and Marette (2002) also offer
a journal article examining generic advertising under product differentiation that is relevant when an organic product is perceived to
be of higher quality than its conventional counterpart.
Pack and Supply
Commodity Grade Size Container Control Advertising Research
California Almonds X X X X X
California Kiwifruit X X X
Washington-Oregon Winter Pears X X
Table S.1.  Active Provisions of the Case Study Federal Marketing OrdersMarketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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The federal marketing orders for almonds, kiwifruit,
and winter pears differ with respect to the provisions
that are authorized and utilized (Table S.1). They
collectively include all of the kinds of provisions that
are commonly part of marketing orders. The almond
order has the largest budget and also provides for and
employs the most provisions. It includes minimum
grade standards, advertising and promotion, and
research programs and is the only one of the three
that includes supply control (reserves). The kiwifruit
order focuses on minimum maturity, grade, and size
standards and also contains pack and container
regulations. In addition, it established a separate state
entity, the California Kiwifruit Commission (CKC), to
conduct advertising and promotion. The Oregon-
Washington winter pear marketing order has active
provisions for advertising and promotion and for
research. It also includes a provision for mandatory
minimum grades and sizes, but that provision has not
been used for several years.
Procedure
A case study was prepared for each of the three com-
modities. The first step was to identify data sources
for each commodity and collect published economic
data, including acreage, yields, production, average
prices, total revenues, exports, imports, and consump-
tion. Issues that organic producers and handlers have
with the marketing orders were identified through meet-
ings with personnel from each of the administrative
committee offices. The committees also provided con-
tact information for organic handlers3 and unpublished
industry data for organic and conventional fruits and
nuts that was volunteered to them by handlers. Or-
ganic handlers of each commodity were contacted to
schedule a personal or telephone interview. Participat-
ing handlers were asked about the volume they
currently market, outlets they utilize, the prices they
have received, and their views on growth in the or-
ganic market and how marketing order provisions
affect their own marketing efforts. The case studies
organize and report the production and marketing
information assembled for each organic commodity
and focus on the marketing order issues that tend to
be unique to organic products.
The authors were fortunate to have the coopera-
tion of the United States Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA’s) Agricultural Marketing Service and Economic
Research Service and of the Organic Farming Research
Foundation. This study would not have been possible
without the active participation and cooperation of the
marketing order administrative committees and the or-
ganic handlers.
Findings
This section of the report compares study results for
the three commodities in terms of commodity data
and marketing order provisions. It is important to note
that for each commodity the views of handlers and
producers ranged from strong support to strong op-
position and were not necessarily uniform for all the
provisions of an order. Readers interested in more
detailed information about each commodity are referred
to the case studies.
Production of Organic Commodities
A goal of this study was development of estimates
of organic acreage and production for each commod-
ity that could offer perspective on the relative
importance of organic products for each marketing
order. The administrative committees have all gathered
recent information on the organic sector of their in-
dustries but have little historical data. The California
Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), which
administers the California Organic Foods Act, tracks
registered organic almond and kiwifruit acreage, and
CKC has collected and published separate data sets
on crop size, movement, fruit size, and packaging for
organic and conventional kiwifruit beginning with the
2000–01 marketing year. The Pear Bureau Northwest
(PBN) collects data on organic pear production and
marketing. These sources were combined with infor-
mation from organic handlers to develop the estimates
shown in Table S.2.
3 Contact information for organic almond handlers and a page containing information for winter pear handlers are available on Web
sites maintained by the marketing order administrative committees. See www.almondboard.com and www.usapears.com.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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Note in Table S.2 that the organic share of produc-
tion is smaller than the organic share of acreage for
each commodity, indicating that average per-acre yields
are less for organic production in all three cases.
The average number of acres per operation is lower
for organic almond and winter pear growers than for
conventional operations while organic kiwifruit grow-
ers’ average size operation is slightly larger than the
conventional average (Table S.3). Given the estimated
number of organic growers (almonds, 81; kiwifruit,
20; winter pears, 80) and estimated acreage, average
organic almond and winter pear operations consist of
fewer acres than the average operation for the industry
as a whole, while the average organic kiwifruit opera-
tion has slightly more acres than the industry average.
Based on Almond Almanac figures, the average Califor-
nia almond grower has 80 acres of almonds while the
average organic almond grower has 37 acres. The av-
erage California kiwifruit grower has 13 acres while
the average organic kiwifruit grower has 15 acres. The
average Washington-Oregon pear grower has 17 acres
of winter pears while the average organic winter pear
grower has 13 acres.
Organic Handlers
Interviews were completed with 12 of the 14 or-
ganic almond handlers, eight of the ten organic
kiwifruit handlers, and ten of the 15 organic pear han-
dlers. Table S.4 summarizes some interesting
characteristics of the handlers interviewed—how long
they have been handling organic products, how and
why they got started in organics, and the size of their
operations.
There are approximately 110 almond handlers in
California, of which 14 (12.7 percent) handle organic
almonds; seven of the 14 handle only organic almonds.
For kiwifruit, there are approximately 54 handlers in
the state, ten of which (18.5 percent) handle organic
kiwifruit. Seven of those ten handle organic kiwifruit
only. For Washington-Oregon winter pears, there are
approximately 70 handlers, 15 of which (21.4 percent)
handle organic pears. At least six of those handle only
organic pears.
A comparison of the percentage of organic handlers
for each crop with organics’ share of production
(Table S.2) indicates the relatively small size of organic
packouts (e.g., for almonds, 12.7 percent of almond
handlers account for only 0.35 percent of total out-
put).
The degree of handler specialization varies by com-
modity. Seven of the 12 organic almond handlers deal
only in almonds, but all of the organic kiwifruit han-
dlers pack other organic commodities and nine of the
ten organic pear handlers pack other organic prod-
ucts. Organic almond handlers typically handle other
organic nuts, while organic kiwifruit handlers tend to
include other organic fruit crops (plums, pears, apples,
and apricots). Organic winter pear handlers tend to
handle organic Bartlett pears and organic apples.
                      Percent Share of Total
Commodity Growers Acres Production Acreage Production
Almonds 81 2,959 3,015,221 lbs 0.56% 0.35%
Kiwifruit 20 297 2,476,642 lbs 6.47% 6.06%
Winter Pears 80 1,000    422,267 boxes1 3.80% 2.75%
1 A standard box of winter pears weighs 44 pounds. Total production was approximately 18,579,784 lbs.
Table S.2.  Estimated Organic Acreage and Production for Almonds, Kiwifruit, and Winter Pears,
2001–02 Marketing Year




CA Almonds 80 37
CA Kiwifruit 13 15
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When asked why they decided to start packing and
marketing organic products, handlers’ responses var-
ied, but “health and environmental concerns” and
“economic reasons” were mentioned most often. Han-
dlers who have been involved with organic
commodities for the longest period of time tended to
have started as producers and integrated packing into
their operations when existing packers were not inter-
ested in handling organic products. Their interest in
organic production was typically based on environ-
mental and health concerns. Some of these handlers
also mentioned economic reasons—higher prices and
lower production costs for organic products. Many of
the newer handlers gave economic reasons such as
“existing producers shifted to organic production,” “or-
ganic prices are higher,” and “better margins for organic
products.” While the years that the handlers have been
involved with organic products varies widely, overall
the typical organic handler has a relatively new opera-
tion. Note that the average number of years for which
handlers have been packing organic products is very
similar for the three commodities (Table S.4). This is
probably due to the relatively recent rise of organic
commodities to commercial importance.
Marketing Issues
The three organic commodities share some
interesting characteristics related to marketing,
including channels of distribution, prices and pricing,
and individual handler advertising and promotion
efforts. These similarities are undoubtedly related to
their volume of sales, product category, and customer
base. Production of each of the three organic crops is
small compared to total production, the handler
operations tend to be small, and the organic segment
is a limited portion of the total market that is typically
reached through specialized vendors. Overall, organic
handlers for each commodity use the same channels
of distribution as do conventional handlers, but there
are more intermediaries involved in organic channels
and they market to a different mix of outlets. A large
share of conventional produce sales are made directly
to large chain-store retailers. If an organic handler sells
directly to a retailer, it is likely to be a specialized
supermarket chain that emphasizes organic produce,
such as Whole Foods or Wild Oats, although some
large handlers have sold product directly to Safeway
(which apparently has buyers who specialize in organic
fruits and vegetables). Organic handlers tend to sell
through wholesalers, organic distributors, and brokers
to reach smaller organic food stores, food cooperatives,
and supermarkets that have organic food sections.
Several organic handlers also sell a significant amount
of their product directly through the Internet and
farmers markets.
Export sales of organic produce were reported for
each of the commodities, but the volumes are small
(in both quantity and percentage) compared to exports
of conventional product for the same commodity.
Specifically, the California almond industry supplies
the world—more than 70 percent of the 2000–01 crop
went to export markets. However, only seven of the
12 organic almond handlers had export sales
and, based on their
responses, exports made
up only about 25
percent of their total
organic sales. Exports
of California kiwifruit,
which were once quite
important, now account
for only approximately
20 percent of annual
production. About two-
thirds of annual U.S.
kiwifruit consumption
is from imports. Only
two handlers reported
Table S.4.  Respondent Handler Characteristics
Almonds Kiwifruit Winter Pears
No. of Handlers 12 8 10
No. That Handle Other Crops 7 of 12 8 of 8 9 of 10
Reason for Organic Operation
   Health/environment 7 2 4
   Economics 9 4 5
Years in Organic Packing
   Range 1–24 1–17 1–19
   Average 10.1 9.7 9.0Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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organic kiwifruit exports during the 2000–01
marketing year, and the volumes were less than 10
percent of their packs. U.S. pear exports have increased
significantly since the late 1980s; for 2000–01, 32
percent of the total northwest winter pear crop was
exported. For 2001–02, approximately 24 percent of
the organic winter pear crop was exported, with 13
percent shipped offshore (mainly to the United
Kingdom), 6.6 percent sold to Mexico, and 3.8 percent
sold to Canada. Six of the ten organic winter pear
handlers reported export sales, with exports ranging
from 5 to 40 percent of their total packs.
Premium prices for organic products are a major
factor in the growth of the organic commodities ex-
amined in this study and will be an important
determinant of future production trends. There is a
limited quantity of detailed cost-of-production data,
but it appears that costs per unit of output for organic
almonds, kiwifruit, and winter pears are higher than
for their conventional counterparts. Though organic
production allows for a reduction in purchased in-
puts, those savings tend to be offset by lower yields
and increased labor requirements. Thus, to be profit-
able, organic products must be sold for premium
prices over conventional prices, which they have. Or-
ganic almonds have recently been sold for a price two
to four times higher than the price for conventional
almonds; the premium for organic kiwifruit has re-
cently been 20 to 30 percent; and organic winter pear
handlers report prices that are 20 to 25 percent higher
than for conventional winter pears. Kiwifruit and win-
ter pear handlers report that their organic fruit has
enjoyed much higher premiums in the past but that
the differential has narrowed as organic production
has increased.
Almost all of the organic almond and kiwifruit
handlers and a majority of winter pear packers expect
organic production of their crops to expand. While
consumption of each of the organic commodities has
increased over time despite premium prices, there is
widespread concern that future production increases
will place additional pressure on the premiums. Several
kiwifruit and winter pear handlers reported occasionally
or regularly selling organic fruit as conventional fruit
at conventional prices when (1) conventional prices
were high, (2) the organic market was saturated with
product, and (3) the quality of the commodity was
too low for the organic market. For both these
commodities, smaller and lower grade organic fruit
are most likely to be sold as conventional.
All three industries conduct generic advertising and
promotion programs. Almonds and winter pears are
marketed through producer-funded advertising and
promotion provisions in the federal marketing orders
while California kiwifruit are marketed by a state com-
mission. In addition, several handlers reported private
advertising expenditures, although the amounts were
usually small. This private advertising was typically
for trade shows, ads about product availability in in-
dustry and organic trade publications, Web sites, and
directories. At least one organic almond handler, us-
ing credit-back provisions in the marketing order (credit
toward assessments for advertising expenditures), used
print advertising to final consumers and provided
point-of-purchase materials to retailers.4 Overall, seven
of the 12 organic almond handlers, four of the eight
organic kiwifruit handlers, and two of the ten organic
pear handlers did some private advertising.
Slotting fees charged by large food retailers are a
controversial development in produce marketing. All
of the organic handlers who participated in this study
stated that they have not paid slotting fees to secure
shelf space for products. One organic winter pear han-
dler reported paying mandatory advertising fees to a
retailer to continue as a supplier.
Handler Views
on Marketing Order Provisions
An important study objective was to examine the views
of organic handlers and producers on the federal
marketing orders that regulate their products. Each
marketing order consists of a unique combination of
provisions and programs that apply to the entire
product (organic and conventional) produced and
packed in the geographic area covered by the order.
The administrative committees for the marketing orders
operate several special programs for organic
4 The almond marketing order is the only one of the three that provides credit toward the marketing order assessment for
advertising that meets criteria established by the Almond Board.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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production that recognize its unique characteristics.
The kiwifruit and winter pear administrative
committees, for example, publish separate market
statistics for organic production, grades, seasonal
movement, packages, and inventory. The committees
also prepare directories of producers of organic
products that can be accessed by buyers. In addition,
the Winter Pear Control Committee (WPCC), which
administers the winter pear marketing order, supplies
point-of-purchase materials about organic pears to
retailers. The committee for the almond order, Almond
Board of California (ABC), effectively exempted organic
almonds from its most recent reserve programs.
Handlers for each of the three commodities were
asked (1) which marketing order programs work and
which programs do not work for organic products,
and (2) to suggest program improvements. Handler
views are summarized for quality standards, research
programs, supply controls, and advertising and pro-
motion.
Mandatory Minimum Quality Standards
The almond and kiwifruit marketing orders have
mandatory minimum quality standards. Although the
winter pear marketing order authorizes grade, size, and
quality regulations, these provisions have not been
used since the 1978–79 marketing year. The order does
require federal inspection of pears before shipping
from the handler.
Handlers for all three commodities view the typical
organic consumer of their products as having above-
average education, income, concern about health, and
environmental awareness. The handlers for each
commodity commented that their customers are very
concerned about quality and that they must supply a
quality product regardless of marketing order
provisions. One kiwifruit handler described the market
evolution for organic kiwifruit as “beginning with
customers who were most concerned about farming
practices.” As consumers became acquainted with
organic kiwifruit, they came to appreciate the taste but
were not overly concerned with appearance. Now, he
said, his customers want fruit that tastes good and is
free from blemishes. Another handler markets only
his U.S. No. 1 organic kiwifruit as organic; fruit that
does not meet the No. 1 grade standard is sold as
conventional.
The handlers for organic almonds and kiwifruit
were asked whether mandatory minimum quality stan-
dards help sell their organic product. Seven of the 12
organic almond handlers responded positively that the
standards increase sales. These handlers indicated that
the grades are known and respected by buyers world-
wide as an indicator of quality. Three of the handlers
did not object to the use of mandatory standards but
indicated that their buyers demand quality and that
the almonds must look good and satisfy existing stan-
dards in order to be sold. Two handlers said that
minimum quality standards did not help them mar-
ket organic almonds.
Kiwifruit handlers expressed a variety of opinions
on the value of minimum quality standards for or-
ganic kiwifruit. Two of the smallest producer/handlers,
who market only their own fruit, said that the mini-
mum size requirement tended to result in more culls
for organic than for conventional fruit. One, however,
added that the economic impact was minimal because
organic consumers would not buy the small-cull fruit.
Four of the eight handlers were very positive and sup-
portive of existing quality standards, which they said
help sell organic kiwifruit by maintaining consistent
quality and giving buyers confidence in the product.
The same four handlers also believe that current stan-
dards are fair. One handler criticized the maturity
standard for sugar levels as too low (the average mini-
mum maturity of 6.5 percent soluble solids was
reduced to 6.2 percent for the 2000–01 season).
All of the organic winter pear handlers sort their
fruit according to USDA standards. Organic pears that
do not meet the standards are processed. Handlers were
asked if additional standards or mandatory standards
would help them market organic pears. Five of the ten
organic winter pear handlers did not believe that addi-
tional standards are required or would help in
marketing. One noted that his customers have their
own standards and that mandatory minimum stan-
dards would not help. On the other hand, four of the
handlers support industry-wide minimum quality stan-
dards as assuring that all organic winter pears are “good
quality.” One of these handlers noted that there are
additional production standards for organic pears andGiannini Foundation Research Report 346
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that these stringent standards should be made known
to consumers.
Mandatory minimum quality standards, as cur-
rently structured and applied to the commodities
studied, are not controversial. Overall, there was not a
great difference in views between the organic handlers
operating under mandatory minimum quality stan-
dards (almonds and kiwifruit) and those without such
restrictions (winter pears). Many of the handlers be-
lieve that the third-party stamp of quality provided by
grades and standards is an important marketing tool.
Organic customers are generally viewed as significantly
concerned about quality, and most of the almond and
kiwifruit handlers agreed that they pack a high-quality
product without mandatory quality standards. The
greater impact that current quality standards may have
on organic products generally is not regarded as a se-
rious problem for two reasons. First, quality-conscious
organic consumers are probably not interested in prod-
ucts that do not meet the minimum standards. Second,
there are premium-price alternative uses for organic
almonds and winter pears that do not meet grade stan-
dards.
Research
The marketing orders for California almonds and
Washington-Oregon winter pears each have active pro-
visions for marketing and production research. ABC
runs two major research programs, one on nutrition
and the other on production. The nutrition program,
to which ABC allocated $1 million for 2001–02, is
focused on consumer health concerns that provide a
base for domestic marketing programs. ABC also funds
production research projects in orchard management,
variety development, pests, diseases, irrigation, tree
nutrition, and pollination. The proposed research bud-
get for 2002–03 allocates $583,604 to 28 projects.
One of those projects emphasizes organics and sev-
eral of the integrated pest management (IPM) projects
have potential applications to organic production.
WPCC currently collects an assessment of two cents
per standard box of pears for research projects, with
total research funds recently averaging about $300,000
annually. While none of WPCC’s projects is specifi-
cally dedicated to organic winter pears, funded IPM
projects have potential benefits for both organic and
conventional producers.
The organic almond handlers in the study gener-
ally regard ABC’s research favorably. They were most
positive in their comments on nutrition research on
the health benefits of almonds. They believe that this
research helps emphasize health benefits that consum-
ers are seeking when they purchase organic almonds.
One handler expressed his desire for separate research
on the organic industry, even though he realizes that
it would be a small share of the total research pro-
gram.
Six of the ten organic winter pear handlers re-
sponded positively to the market and production
research funded by WPCC. There were positive com-
ments on post-harvest projects, market research, and
production research. Four handlers stated that, though
production research is driven by conventional pears,
the results benefit both organic and conventional pro-
ducers. Another commented that IPM research is
valuable for organic growers. Two of the handlers were
not familiar with any research results that were of use
to organic producers. One commented that he pays
no attention to anything that WPCC does.
Supply Control
The almond marketing order is the only one of the
three that controls the amount of product marketed.
Control over supply marketed is achieved through two
forms of volume control, allocated and unallocated
reserves. Allocated reserves permanently remove al-
monds from primary consuming markets and divert
them to secondary markets such as animal feed.
Unallocated reserves temporarily restrict the flow of
almonds to the market at specific points in time and
then release them later in the marketing year or even
in the next marketing year. ABC used unallocated re-
serves twice during the last decade—1994–95 and
1999–2000—but effectively exempted organic almonds
from those programs by including sales of organic
almonds to organic outlets as an authorized reserve
outlet. As expected, most of the organic handlers said
that the reserve program did not create any problems
for marketing organic almonds.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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Ten of the 12 organic almond handlers offered
comments on almond reserves. Of those ten, six were
strongly opposed philosophically to reserves for
organic or conventional almonds. They “do not believe
in reserves” and believe that there should be a “free
market.” One stated that “handlers should be free to
decide when and how much to store for later sale.”
The other four handlers saw no reason to have reserves
for organic almonds given the tight supply situation
relative to demand. Three of the four mentioned that
reserves could possibly be useful in the future if organic
almonds are overproduced relative to their market.
Advertising and Promotion
The majority of assessments under the marketing
orders fund generic advertising and promotion pro-
grams as opposed to research, grades, and standards.
While generic advertising and promotion programs
for agricultural commodities have increased demand
and generally yielded positive returns on producer-
funded expenditures, they continue to be disputed by
some. This is especially true among organic handlers
and producers, whose market niche does not neces-
sarily benefit from increases in overall demand. The
degree of separation (or of market integration) between
organic and conventional consumer markets, while
very important, has not been quantified. However, most
of the organic handlers who offered comments noted
that the market for their organic product is distinct
from the market for the conventional commodity. They
also believe that their organic product is clearly supe-
rior to the conventional product in several dimensions.
These views undoubtedly influence handler/producer
evaluations of the contribution of advertising and pro-
motion programs to sales of organic products.
Seven of the 12 participating almond handlers
reported advertising expenditures for their organic
almonds in addition to their contributions to ABC, in
amounts ranging from $600 to more than $50,000
annually. As expected, views on the contribution of
ABC advertising and promotion to organic almond
sales were mixed. Three of the five handlers who made
no additional advertising and promotion expenditures
stated that ABC’s program does affect total almond
demand but does not help sell organic almonds. The
other two stated that the ABC program does not help
them sell their organic product. Five of the seven
handlers who do some of their own advertising and
promotion are supportive of ABC’s programs. Three
believe that ABC’s efforts have an indirect positive effect
by increasing the demand for all almonds (“helps sell
almonds in general but does not provide direct help
to market organic almonds”); the other two indicated
that nutritional messages based on the ABC research
program help market organic almonds. Handlers from
two large organic operations stated that they do not
believe that ABC’s advertising and promotion program
is effective for organic or conventional almonds and
would prefer to be exempt from assessments for
advertising and promotion.
Two of the ten organic winter pear handlers inter-
viewed reported advertising expenditures separate from
assessments paid to WPCC. One of them believes that
generic advertising conducted by WPCC helps mar-
ket organic pears while the other stated that it provides
no help. Two other organic handlers also believe that
industry advertising has not helped them market or-
ganic pears. The remaining six handlers believe that
WPCC advertising and promotion benefit all pear
growers but they are not enthusiastic about the pro-
grams. Two of the handlers believe that sales of organic
winter pears would benefit from a complete separa-
tion between organic and conventional pear
advertising and promotion. They think that organic
winter pears should be promoted for their positive
effect on the environment, freedom from synthetic
pesticides, and other features that differentiate them
from conventional winter pears.
The 2002 Farm Bill includes a section that exempts
certified organic products from commodity promotion
assessments. The bill directs USDA to issue regulations
exempting any person who produces and markets
solely 100 percent certified organic products. Such
producers are to be exempted only from the portion
of the assessments used for market promotion. On
December 1, 2003, USDA proposed amendments to
28 fruit and vegetable marketing order programs that
authorize market promotion activities, including the
orders covering Washington-Oregon winter pears and
California almonds. The kiwifruit order is not impacted
because it does not include promotion. Since organicGiannini Foundation Research Report 346
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winter pear handlers in this study were contacted after
passage of the bill, they were asked for their opinion
on the number of 100 percent organic producers who
will elect not to pay commodity promotion
assessments. Half of the ten handlers stated that all of
the producers who qualify will opt out. These
producers account for about 40 percent of the organic
winter pear pack. Among the other five handlers, three
indicated that few of their producers were eligible (100
percent organic) and the other two did not provide an
estimate. Two of the three handlers with few eligible
producers said that it would be a mistake for organic
producers not to pay the promotion assessment since
organic production is increasing. They believe that
organic producers will need the resources and skills
provided by PBN to reach retail stores and conventional
supermarkets.
Organic kiwifruit handlers were asked for their
views on CKC’s advertising and promotion programs.
Four of the eight handlers spend money to advertise
their own product. One of those handlers believes that
CKC’s advertising has expanded the demand for all
kiwifruit but that recent budget reductions have re-
stricted the impact of the programs. Seven of the eight
handlers stated that present CKC advertising and pro-
motion does not help market organic kiwifruit.
Impressions and Opinions
This research generated some distinct impressions and
opinions that the authors record here with the caveat
that they are only impressions and opinions. They are
based on meetings and conversations with marketing
order administrators, interviews with and written com-
ments from organic handlers and producers, industry
data, and the process of summarizing all of the infor-
mation collected. These comments are offered as an
additional context in which to view the results reported.
The cooperation of all of the participants in the
study was impressive. All are extremely busy people
who generously took time to answer questions, ex-
plain complex points, and provide confidential data
and information. They are also deeply committed to
their industries, have a sincere belief in what they do,
and are keenly interested in strengthening the indus-
try even when they disagree about how best to do it.
The marketing order administrative committees
conduct many programs and activities that, while not
specifically directed toward organic products, cannot
help but benefit individual organic products and pro-
ducers. For example, a well-structured and meaningful
set of grades and standards based on customer needs
and preferences provides for efficient functioning of
markets and improved returns to producers. Organic
handlers as a group are very concerned about provid-
ing high-quality products for their customers, and the
present sets of grades and standards appear to be serv-
ing them well. Suggestions for changes in minimum
grade standards by organic handlers tended to be in
the direction of higher standards.
Despite some strong criticism from individual han-
dlers regarding their administrative committees’
tendency to direct research at conventional produc-
tion and producers, this study suggests that organic
producers can benefit substantially from marketing
order research programs. There are two possible prob-
lems with current research programs and their results.
First, there appear to be cases where individual research-
ers, research committees, and marketing order
administrative committees could do a better job of
communicating results to organic producers. For ex-
ample, they could prepare summary reports of the
research that include the results’ implications for or-
ganic producers. Second, there are organic and
conventional producers in each industry who oppose
marketing order programs (for a variety of reasons)
and who consequently will ignore anything generated
by an administrative committee.
Organic producers and handlers are not alone in
their skepticism. Ongoing legal actions directed at
mandatory assessments for generic commodity adver-
tising are evidence of similar opposition among
conventional producers.
Organic producers are asking two questions regard-
ing such assessments: (1) to what extent does an organic
product benefit from an increase in demand for a com-
modity and is the benefit greater than the cost, and (2)
would a separate advertising and promotion program
for the organic product yield higher returns? It ap-
pears that organic producers do benefit from programs
that increase overall demand for a commodity. The
conventional commodity price provides a floor forMarketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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the organic product price, and organic products can-
not always be sold at a premium, as noted for kiwifruit
and winter pears.
Several organic handlers indicated their belief that
the markets for organic and conventional commodi-
ties are separate markets but that there is a positive
relationship between organic and conventional prices.
If this is true, organic producers benefit from increased
demand for the conventional commodity. If the de-
gree of substitutability between organic and
conventional products is low (they are essentially dif-
ferent products), an advertising and promotion
program stressing the favorable characteristics of the
organic product may be more effective than a generic
program. This is consistent with the general observa-
tion that it is often more profitable for a small firm to
capture market share from a competitor than it is to
increase total demand for a product. The problem for
the small firm, the organic producer in this case, is
raising the funds required for an effective advertising
program.
The assessments paid by organic producers and
handlers are relatively small and, if segregated, would
buy little in the way of separate advertising programs
for the organic product. Thus, organic producers’ con-
tributions to the overall commodity program may
provide access to advertising that would not be pos-
sible under a separate budget. Organic producers and
handlers gain access to retailers, trade information, and
such things as point-of-purchase materials, Web sites,
and organized public relations. Simply becoming more
involved with the administrative committees individu-
ally or better organizing as an interest group within
the order could yield dividends. Consequently, it ap-
pears that marketing orders can serve the needs of both
organic and conventional handlers and producers.
Still, the reservations some organic handlers and
producers expressed were not a surprise. They ques-
tion the value they receive for the mandatory
assessments paid. Organic producers and handlers are
pioneers and many are also individualists. They face
all of the production uncertainties confronting con-
ventional producers while foregoing some
well-developed risk-reducing technologies. Those who
have adopted organic production methods to improve
returns know that an increase in total production can
easily erase any organic price premium.
Handlers expressed their views on the important
issue of the degree of substitution between organic
and conventional products. While the question cannot
be settled without additional research, handlers’
comments did provide some important insight.
First, there is asymmetric substitutability on the
supply side. An organically produced product that
meets minimum quality standards can be sold either
as organic or as conventional but only organically
produced product can be sold as organic. In terms of
appearance, there is no way to distinguish an organic
almond, kiwifruit, or pear from a conventional one.
Some organic handlers believe that their organic prod-
uct is superior to conventional product in terms of
characteristics such as taste or storability, but such
differences are difficult to distinguish and measure.
On the consumer side, there is a segment of the
market that demands organically produced products,
is willing to pay a premium price for those products,
and relies on third party certification and labeling to
identify them. There are also consumers who purchase
both organic and conventional products based on
availability and relative prices. The future for organic
products depends, to a certain extent, on the size and
growth of the market segment that strongly prefers
organically produced products and is willing to pay a
premium. The size of this segment is not clear, but
organic production accounts for a little more than 6
percent of California kiwifruit and 2.75 percent of
winter pears (Table S.2). Price premiums for organic
kiwifruit and winter pears have been decreasing as
production has increased, and handlers for both com-
modities report that they have sold organically
produced product in the conventional market. A por-
tion of organic fruit sales in conventional markets is
fruit of lesser quality that does not meet organic cus-
tomer quality preferences. Organic handlers for both
commodities are concerned that increasing organic pro-
duction will place greater downward pressure on the
price premium for organic products.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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Case Studies
Details of the information collected and assembled
about organic production and marketing for Califor-
nia almonds, California kiwifruit, and
Washington-Oregon winter pears, together with or-
ganic producer/handler views on marketing order
provisions, are assembled in the case studies that fol-
low. In particular, questions regarding consumer
substitution between organic and conventional prod-
ucts, views on the effects of quality standards, and
benefits of advertising and promotion programs on
organic products raised in this summary are presented
in more detail in the case studies.
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1. CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA ORGANIC ALMONDS
T
he federal marketing order for California almonds
(Marketing Order 981 as amended), first effective
in 1950, regulates the handling of all almonds pro-
duced in the state. It authorizes production research,
market promotion and development, and paid adver-
tising. It also includes quality control regulations and
volume control measures in the form of allocated and
unallocated reserves. All of the provisions of the mar-
keting order except volume control are presently being
used. In addition, almonds received by handlers are
subject to mandatory inspection and reporting require-
ments. To date, the order’s requirements have been
the same for conventional and organic almonds, but
this situation may change when rules are issued for
the 2002 Farm Bill. On December 1, 2003, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) proposed amend-
ments to 28 fruit and vegetable marketing order
programs that authorize market promotion activities.
The marketing order for California almonds is among
the programs affected by the amendments. Specifically,
growers who are 100 percent certified organic will be
exempt from commodity promotion assessments.
The Almond Board of California (ABC), composed
of five producers and five handlers elected by the in-
dustry, administers the marketing order. As part of its
administrative function, ABC collects and disseminates
economic and industry statistics.
California Production
California’s almond industry expanded production
from about 45 million pounds produced on 90,000
acres in 1950 to some 830 million pounds from ap-
proximately 525,000 acres in 2001. According to the
Figure 1.1.  California Almonds: Bearing Acreage, Total Production, and Average Yield Per Acre, 1980–2000
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service, California Fruit & Nut Acreage, annual issues.
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California Agricultural Statistics Service (CASS), the ob-
jective forecast for California’s 2002–03 almond crop
is 980 million meat pounds from 530,000 acres.
While this will be the largest almond crop on record,
recent new plantings and nonbearing acreage totaling
70,000 acres guarantee even larger crops in the future.
The growth of California’s almond industry from
1980 through 2001 is shown in Figure 1.1. Bearing
acreage, which had reached 326,800 acres by 1980,
continued to trend up through the 1980s and 1990s,
reaching 500,000 acres in 2000. Average yields varied
significantly from year to year, ranging from a low of
601 pounds per acre in 1986 to a high of 1,740
pounds per acre in 1999. Note that there is some evi-
dence of alternate bearing (high yields followed by
low yields), but there are examples of yields decreas-
ing or increasing in two consecutive years (1982–83,
1985–86, 1988–89, and 1996–97). The annual varia-
tion in total crop size is due to year-to-year variations
in average yields and not annual changes in bearing
acreage.
As the world’s leading almond producer, Califor-
nia accounted for 41 percent of total annual world
almond production for 1996 through 2000. Spain,
the second largest producer, accounted for 27 percent
of world production during the same period, and the
remaining 32 percent was divided among Portugal (1
percent), Greece (5 percent), Turkey (4 percent), Tuni-
sia (6 percent), Morocco (7 percent), and Italy (9
percent). California dominates world exports to an
even greater extent, accounting for 85 percent of total
exports by volume from 1996 through 2000
(Figure 1.2).
Industry observers generally agree that the almond
marketing order has been an important factor in the
growth and development of California’s almond in-
dustry. An Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) review
of the marketing order dated June 14, 2002, concluded
that the marketing order has been used effectively in
expanding markets and in finding new uses for al-
monds to absorb increasing production. The report
also notes that nearly 90 percent of the producers who
Figure 1.2.  Quantity of Almond Exports from Major Worldwide Producers, 1980–2000
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voted in a 1998 continuance referendum supported
the marketing order and that both handlers and pro-
ducers support marketing order activities that help
ensure marketing of a high-quality product in expand-
ing markets.5
California Organic Production
Data on organic almond production and sales have
only recently become available and are not compre-
hensive. Data series on organic acreage and prices are
not available, but the handler interviews enabled de-
velopment of some estimates.
ABC indicates on its Web site that 16 of the state’s
approximately 110 almond handlers market organic
almonds, all of whom were contacted. One no longer
handles organic almonds and another processes but
does not market them. Information was obtained from
12 of the remaining 14 handlers regarding their views
on the impacts of the order on organic almonds and
developments in organic production and marketing.
Five of the handlers produce, pack, and market their
own organic almonds. Three produce organic almonds
and also pack organic almonds for other producers.
The remaining four handlers do not produce almonds.
Among the seven handlers who pack almonds pro-
duced by other growers, two provide custom packing
services for producers who market their own almonds,
one markets almonds on a commission basis, and the
other four purchase the almonds from the producers
and do all the processing and marketing.
According to the most recent CASS survey, almond
orchards in California in 2002 totaled 590,000 acres—
530,000 bearing and 60,000 nonbearing. The bearing
acreage included 2,912 acres of organic almonds (0.56
percent of the total), as reported to the California Or-
ganic Program. This figure is consistent with
information provided by handlers. The 12 organic han-
dlers noted above handled organic production for 81
growers whose organic acreage was estimated at 2,796.
The remaining 163 acres is apparently in the hands of
the other two handlers.
Some information on average yields and produc-
tion of organic almonds was obtained from seven of
the cooperating handlers for crop years 1999, 2000,
and 2001. The variation in average yields among them
was significant, ranging from 205 to 1,602 pounds
per acre. Handlers attributed the variation to weather
conditions and the varying ages of trees; some orchards
were just beginning to come into production. Average
yields for the California almond crop as a whole for
1999 and 2000 were 1,729 and 1,397 pounds per
acre. Annual average organic yields for the seven han-
dlers for crops in 1999, 2000, and 2001 were 952,
1,327, and 1,019 pounds per acre, respectively. Com-
bining these average yields with reported organic
acreage generates an estimate of production for 2001–
02 of somewhat more than three million saleable
pounds, which is less than 0.4 percent of total pro-
duction.
Two cost of production studies for organic almonds
conducted in 1992 and published by the University
of California Cooperative Extension Service at Davis
compared microsprinkler and flood irrigation
techniques. Similar studies using the same irrigation
techniques were completed for conventional almonds
in 1998. To compare organic and conventional costs
of producing almonds in California, the costs used in
the 1992 budgets in the two organic studies were
updated to 1998 dollars. The comparison indicates
that total costs per acre (excluding marketing/handling
costs) for organic production are lower than for
conventional production. With sprinkler irrigation,
organic costs of production were $2,514 per acre,
compared to $3,003 for conventional production.
With flood irrigation, organic costs of production were
$2,470 per acre, compared to $2,944 for conventional
production. Thus, the per-acre cost of production is
16 percent lower for organic almonds than for
conventional almonds regardless of which irrigation
technique is used. Cultural costs (excluding harvest
costs) are greater for conventional production, mainly
because of pest control measures, which imply more
material, machine labor, and fuel costs. However, the
budgeted yields for conventional almond production
were 2,000 lbs per acre, compared to 1,550 lbs for
organic almonds. Using these yields, the cost per
pound was lower for conventional than for organic:
5 The AMAA (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937), as amended, permits a cooperative association to vote for its
members. Blue Diamond, the largest almond processor, regularly casts a block vote for its producer members.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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with sprinkler irrigation, conventional was $1.50 per
pound and organic was $1.62 per pound; with flood
irrigation, conventional was $1.47 per pound and
organic was $1.59 per pound.
Demand
Quantitative measures of the demand for organic
almonds could not be made due to a lack of price-
quantity data. However, all of the handlers and
producers interviewed for this study indicated that the
balance of supply and demand for organic almonds
yields premium prices. The amount of the premium
varies; eight of the 11 handlers who commented on
prices indicated that organic almond prices are at least
twice as high as conventional, and three handlers
indicated that organic prices are at least three times
higher. Specifically, one handler who sells both
conventional and organic almonds noted that his
2001–02 conventional prices were $1.20 to $1.40 per
pound and his organic prices were $3.00 to $3.50 per
pound. Another listed 2001–02 conventional prices
of $1.40 to $1.50 per pound and certified organic
prices of $3.80 to $4.00 per pound. Some small
handlers and sellers with specialized market niches
reported prices for organic almonds ranging up to four
times higher than for conventional. One handler
observed that “There is a demand for organic almonds,
but the organic market is underdeveloped. There are
not enough growers, the price is too high, and there is
not enough quality product.”
Handlers made some interesting comments on the
factors that affect the price of organic almonds and
seasonal price movements. Several stated that there is
a large unmet demand for organic almonds and that
they have customers who would like to obtain more
almonds at existing premium prices. There appears to
be some non-price rationing taking place, with some
handlers dividing production among buyers on the
basis of past orders.
Four of the five handlers who market both organic
and conventional almonds and one large organic
handler see correlation between organic and
conventional prices, with organic prices two to four
times higher. Two of these handlers indicated that large
buyers expect the two prices to rise and fall together.
The other seven handlers believe that there is little or
no correlation for price between organic and
conventional almonds. Instead, they see the two as
separate markets and the price of organic almonds
being influenced mostly by the quantity produced.
A recurring question with organic commodities is
the degree of substitution between organic and
conventional product and whether or not the two are
in the same market. There is a degree of separation on
the supply side—conventional almonds cannot be sold
as organic, but organic almonds can be sold as either
organic or conventional. This flexibility on the supply
side tends to place a floor under the price of organic
almonds at the conventional price. None of the
handlers interviewed reported recent sales of organic
almonds as conventional because of the large price
premium and unmet demand for organic almonds.
One handler said he had in the past sold organic
almonds at conventional prices or for use as
conventional almonds but did not explain the
circumstances. Another handler, who has never sold
organic almonds for conventional prices, noted that
“when organic almond prices were very high in the
late 1990s, some handlers waited too long and had to
sell some organic almonds for conventional use.” This
type of miscalculation, which has not occurred recently,
could probably have been avoided had separate
monthly position data for organic almonds been
available. Most industry observers and all but two of
the handlers interviewed expect organic almond
production to increase over time and the price
differential between organic and conventional almonds
to decrease. Economic theory suggests that production
will adjust over time until the price differential between
organic and conventional almonds reflects differences
in costs of production and production risks.
Clearly there are customers with a strong preference
for organic almonds who are willing to pay a premium,
but the size of that market segment is not known.
However, based on what is known about organic
markets for kiwifruit and winter pears, it appears that
the organic market segment for almonds is presently
5 to 10 percent of the total domestic produce market.
The characteristics of demand for organic almonds forMarketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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this segment (price and income elasticities) are
probably similar to the demand for conventional
almonds and that demand will continue to increase.6
Handlers were asked to describe any differences
they have observed between consumers of organic and
conventional almonds. Three handlers stated either that
they were not aware of any differences or that they did
not believe that existing differences were significant.
The nine handlers who described different characteris-
tics for organic and conventional almond consumers
often mentioned more than one difference. They de-
scribed organic consumers as follows (frequency of
mention appears in parentheses): healthier or more
health conscious (5); more aware and more concerned
about the environment (3); more or better educated
(3); wanting the best product (3); having higher in-
comes (2); willing to pay more for organic products
(2).
A reviewer of this study asked why, if organic al-
monds have a separate market, they do not need their
own marketing order. The answer, based on comments
from organic handlers and ABC representatives, is
along the lines of “on the one hand, and then on the
other hand.” First, with regard to separate markets, there
is a segment of organic customers that probably will
not substitute between organic and conventional prod-
uct regardless of the price differential. Then there are
consumers who prefer organics and are willing to pay
some premium for them, with the amount of premium
they will pay varying by individual. Finally, there are
consumers who do not have a clear preference and
will purchase the least expensive product. As the sup-
ply of organic almonds reaches beyond the customers
who will only purchase organics, substitutability be-
tween organic and conventional almonds will increase.
The economic feasibility of a separate marketing or-
der for organic almonds depends on the number of
committed organic producers and the amount of or-
ganic almonds produced since organic producers
would have to provide the required financial support.
Given the overhead costs associated with operating a
marketing order program, organic almond producers
can probably maximize their benefit-cost ratio by con-
tinuing to work with ABC to fund research and
promotion that clearly benefits organic producers.
Marketing Organic Almonds
Production and sales of organic almonds are
comparatively recent developments in California. Two
of the handlers in this study began producing organic
almonds almost twenty years ago and are pioneers in
marketing them. Four more producer/handlers began
producing and marketing organic almonds between
1990 and 1995 because of concerns about health and
the environment. Premium prices for organic almonds
have also provided an incentive to produce, process,
and market certified organic product. More recent
entrants in the organic market expressed concerns
about health and the environment but mentioned the
price premium as an important factor in their decision
to produce and sell organic almonds. The four
handlers who do not produce organic almonds began
to handle them in response to their growers, who were
shifting to organic production; to fill out an existing
organic product line; or to take advantage of higher
margins.
Organic and conventional handlers package
almonds differently, in part because the organic
industry is young and volumes are small, but also
because of the constraints imposed by requirements
of organic production. Several handlers mentioned
potential insect problems with in-shell almonds
because fumigation of stored almonds, standard
practice for conventional almonds, is not permitted
for organic production. As a result, only three of the
organic almond handlers market any in-shell nuts and
in-shell sales account for less than 10 percent of their
total sales. Reported volumes suggest that less than 1
percent of organic sales are of in-shell almonds. In
contrast, some 12 percent of overall 2000–01 export
almond shipments were in-shell. While a few organic
handlers market manufactured products, most organic
sales are in the form of whole shelled almonds.
6 The world demand for almonds has been growing over time with increases in population and income. In an earlier study, Alston
et al. found that almonds are a normal good with positive income elasticities in all countries analyzed. The income elasticity of demand
was approximately unitary (+1.00) in the U.S. and was elastic in some of the largest export markets, including Germany (+1.32),
Japan (+1.85), and Canada (+1.50). The estimated price elasticity of demand was elastic in the U.S. (–1.08), the Netherlands
(–1.10), and Canada (–1.28), but inelastic in other markets.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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Even though the organic almond product mix dif-
fers from conventional almonds, organic handlers as
a group rely on channels of distribution that are simi-
lar to those used for the conventional product. Some
of the smaller organic handlers tend to concentrate on
particular segments. For example, five of the organic
handlers interviewed sell all of their output to domes-
tic customers, with the majority of product going to
wholesale distributors. The other seven handlers mar-
ket their organic almonds to a mix of domestic and
export buyers. Only two of the seven who export sell
more than half of their almonds to foreign buyers.
Five of the 12 handlers have some direct-to-consumer
sales, including mail order and Internet sales. In the
aggregate, organic handlers reported selling approxi-
mately 65 to 70 percent of volume to distributors, 20
to 25 percent to manufacturers, and the remainder di-
rect to consumers or to retail outlets. Based on the
responses of handlers in this study, about 25 percent
of recent organic almond sales were to export mar-
kets, with important destinations including Canada,
Germany, and Japan. This is quite low compared with
the almond crop as a whole in California, 71 percent
of which was exported in 2000–01.
Organic Handler/Producer
Views on the Marketing Order
ABC collects a marketing order assessment of 2.5 cents
per pound from handlers for all almonds produced
in California. Given recent large almond crops, this
small per-pound assessment still provides significant
resources to administer and fund marketing order pro-
grams and activities. For example, the ABC budget for
the 2001–02 marketing year totaled more than $17
million. Budget allocations included domestic adver-
tising and public relations (51.4 percent), international
public relations (9.3 percent), developing markets (5.8
percent), nutrition research (5.8 percent), production
research (3.5 percent), market research (1.2 percent),
administration (20.5 percent), quality control
(1.1 percent), and grants (1.3 percent). Note that the
contribution made by organic almond growers
amounts to less than 0.5 percent of the total funds
available to ABC given an estimated organic crop of
about three million pounds.
Organic almond handlers were asked for their views
on the federal almond marketing order program and
its provisions. Their comments are summarized by
major marketing order provision.
Minimum Grade Standards
The USDA publishes grades and standards for
shelled and in-shell almonds that are applied on a vol-
untary basis to transactions between buyers and sellers.
The grades for organic and conventional almonds are
identical.7 Mandatory use of minimum quality stan-
dards for organic almonds was generally supported
by the organic handlers interviewed. When asked if
the standards impact organic and conventional al-
monds differently, three of the 12 handlers stated that
it is probably harder or more expensive for organic
almonds to meet a specific grade. The other organic
handlers stated that there is no difference. Two of the
organic handlers stated that they have had no trouble
meeting the highest grades.
Seven of the 12 handlers agreed that minimum
grade standards help them sell organic almonds. They
indicated that the grades are known and respected by
buyers worldwide as an indicator of quality. Three
handlers did not object to the use of standards but
indicated that their buyers already demand quality and
that the almonds must look good and satisfy existing
standards in order to be sold. Two handlers said that
minimum quality standards do not help them market
organic almonds.
Handlers were asked how they dispose of almonds
that do not meet minimum grade standards. The large-
volume handlers tend to dispose of subgrade almonds
through a variety of organic product outlets while
smaller handlers tend to use only one or two outlets.
Organic almonds that are not edible are typically sold
to oil manufacturers or for livestock feed. Low-grade
organic almonds are often processed (roasted, sliced)
for use as ingredients in confectionery and baking
applications or made into organic almond butter.
7 There are seven grades for shelled almonds (U.S. Fancy, U.S. Extra No. 1, U.S. No. 1, U.S. Select Sheller Run, U.S. Standard Sheller
Run, U.S. No. 1 Whole and Broken, and U.S. No. 1 Pieces) and four grades for in-shell almonds (U.S. No. 1, U.S. No. 1 Mixed, U.S.
No. 2, and U.S. No. 2 Mixed).Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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Minimum quality standards is the least controver-
sial provision of the marketing order for organic
almond handlers. Most indicate that their customers
require a quality product and that they would grade
their product regardless of marketing order provisions.
Research
ABC funds research in nutrition and production.
Its nutrition research program focuses on issues rel-
evant to consumer health concerns and provides
health-related information for domestic marketing pro-
grams. ABC allocated $1 million to nutrition research
projects during 2001–02. Recent nutrition budget al-
locations include weight control (3 percent),
cardiovascular health (24 percent), composition (20
percent), antioxidants (19 percent), cancer (14 percent),
partnerships (12 percent), and research services (8
percent). Research findings that almonds are a leading
natural source of vitamin E, a powerful antioxidant,
are being used in ABC marketing programs.
Industry-funded production research has a long
history. ABC funds production research projects that
examine orchard management, variety development,
pests, diseases, irrigation, tree nutrition, and pollination.
(See the Appendix for a list of recent research projects
and budgets.) In 2000–01, ABC funded 23 production
projects totaling $445,058. In 2001–02, there were
30 production research projects totaling $543,591, and
the proposed budget for 2002–03 allocates $583,604
to 28 projects. Over the course of those three years,
then, ABC budgeted $1,572,252 for production
research (excluding contingency expenditures). The
distribution of funds by subject area is illustrated in
Figure 1.3.
Most of the production research is designed to gen-
erate primary information about irrigation, cultural
practices, pest control, and disease control that is valu-
able to both conventional and organic producers. The
majority of the funds (65 percent) were allocated to
integrated pest management (IPM) projects that em-
phasize conventional agriculture. These projects
typically included a conventional treatment in the re-
search design. One project (4 percent of funds)
emphasized organic production while 26 percent of
the funds were allocated to projects that primarily ben-
efit conventional almond producers. The
environmental project expenditure (1 percent of funds)
was for research on ways to reduce the impact of dor-
mant sprays (used only in conventional agriculture)
in water sources.
ABC spent 51 percent of its 2000–01 operating
budget on domestic public relations and advertising
primarily focused on consumers (70 percent went to
consumer advertising and 18 percent to consumer
public relations). The public relations program targeted
health-conscious consumers via cooking shows, na-
tional morning news programs, and ABC’s consumer
Web site. Crespi and Sexton found that ABC’s promo-
tion program has been very effective in expanding the
demand for almonds and increasing producer profits.
They estimated that marginal dollars expended pro-
moting almonds have yielded a return to producers
somewhere in the range of 3:1 (a $3 return for every
$1 expended) to 7:1.8
The almond marketing order has assessment credit-
back provisions that allow handlers to receive credit
toward their assessments for their own advertising
expenditures. Briefly, a handler gets $1.00 of
assessment credit for each $1.50 of approved
advertising and promotion expenditures and the credit-
back is limited to one-half of a handler’s total
8 ABC did not conduct advertising and promotion from 1994–95 through 1996–97 due to litigation. Crespi and Sexton estimated
that the suspension cost California almond producers between $90 and $234 million in profits.
Figure 1.3.  Distribution of ABC’s Budgeted
Production Research Expenditures,
2000–01 through 2002–03
Source: Almond Board of California. Personal communication from almond
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assessment. Organic handlers have taken advantage of
this provision.
The handlers were asked if they advertise their al-
monds and for their views on the effectiveness of ABC’s
advertising and promotion program. Specifically, they
were asked whether ABC programs help them market
their organic almonds. Five of the 12 handlers reported
no additional advertising expenditures. The other seven
handlers reported spending an additional $600 to more
than $50,000 annually for advertising. Four of the
handlers reported advertising and promotion expen-
ditures of more than $5,000. The handlers who did
the most advertising and promotion tended to spend
their funds on trade shows, print media, and in-store
promotions. The handlers with small expenditures
used natural health magazines, yellow pages, and Web
sites.
Views on the contribution of ABC’s advertising and
promotion to organic almond sales were mixed. The
five handlers who did not spend additional funds for
advertising and promotion all stated that the ABC pro-
gram does not help them sell organic almonds. Three
of the five, however, indicated that they believe that
the ABC program has increased overall demand for
almonds. Five of the seven handlers who did some
advertising and promotion were supportive of ABC’s
advertising and promotion program. Three stated that
it has an indirect positive effect by increasing the de-
mand for all almonds (“helps sell almonds in general
but does not provide direct help to market organic
almonds”) while the other two indicated that nutri-
tion messages based on ABC’s research program help
market organic almonds. Two of the larger organic
handlers do not believe that ABC’s program is effec-
tive for either organic or conventional almonds and
would prefer to be exempt from assessments for ad-
vertising and promotion.
Comments made by the handlers in their answers
to other questions help to place their responses
regarding advertising and promotion in perspective.
Most of the handlers stated that organic almonds are
clearly superior to conventional almonds. Reasons
given included that organic almonds taste better and
are cleaner, healthier, and free of chemicals. One of the
handlers mentioning taste stated that “when you eat a
whole organic almond, an almond flavor will remain
in your mouth for ten minutes. When you eat a
conventional almond, the flavor will disappear
immediately.” Organic handlers and producers
recognize that these comparisons will not be featured
in ABC advertising and promotion.
When commenting on price differences between
organic and conventional almonds, several handlers
mentioned that demand for organic almonds has been
high relative to supply so they can easily sell more
organic almonds at a profit. Two handlers added that
they have rationed organic almonds to customers who
wanted to buy more than the available supply.
Handlers were asked to suggest improvements that
they would like to see made to the ABC advertising
and promotion program. All but three of the 12 han-
dlers responded. Three responding handlers who do
not support the ABC program believe that closing ABC
or exempting organic almond producers from assess-
ments would be an improvement. Three handlers
would like to see separate promotion for organic al-
monds that mentions the advantages of natural
products (no chemicals, better taste). One handler
would like to see separate research projects designed
for the organic industry, even if the funds are a small
percentage of the total research budget. Two handlers
would like to have ABC collect and report separate
statistics for organic almonds.
Reserves
ABC has the authority to set, with concurrence of
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, both allocated and
unallocated reserves for volume control. Allocated re-
serves permanently divert almonds from primary
consuming markets to secondary markets such as oils,
animal feed, and disposal. During its first two decades,
ABC regularly used allocated reserves to encourage
export sales (exports were a secondary market at that
time), increase domestic prices, and increase total crop
revenue.9
Unallocated reserves temporarily restrict the flow
of almonds to the market at specific points in time.
9 Reserves ranging from 10 to 45 percent of total production were used every year except three during the 22-year period from 1951
through 1972 (Bushnell and King).Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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A percentage of the crop may be withheld at harvest
and released at intervals during the marketing season
or may be withheld throughout the season and released
during the following crop year. Most analysts agree
that allocated reserves have much more potential than
unallocated reserves to enhance almond prices during
a given marketing year. ABC has used volume regula-
tion in the form of an unallocated reserve only twice
during the last decade—during the 1994–95 and the
1999–00 marketing years. The most recent use of al-
located reserves was very controversial throughout the
industry and became an issue during board member
elections.
Organic handlers were asked for their opinions
about reserves for organic almonds and if the use of
reserves created any problems for marketing organic
almonds. Two of the handlers did not express any views
on the reserve provisions of the almond marketing
order. Of the ten handlers who commented, six were
strongly opposed philosophically to reserves for or-
ganic or conventional almonds. They stated that they
“do not believe in reserves” and that there should be a
“free market.” One stated that “handlers should be free
to decide when and how much to store for later sale.”
The other four handlers saw no reason to have reserves
for organic almonds given the tight supply situation
relative to demand. Three of the four mentioned that
reserves could possibly be useful in the future if or-
ganic almonds are overproduced.
ABC effectively exempted organic almonds from
the 1994–95 and 1999–00 unallocated reserve pro-
grams by including sales of organic almonds to organic
outlets as an authorized reserve outlet. Consequently,
as expected, most of the organic handlers said that
recent reserve programs had not created any problems
for them. One handler commented that the larger than
usual volume of nuts going to almond butter (one of
the authorized reserve outlets) affected his business
for organic almond butter by increasing the supply of
almond butter. Presumably, a resulting decrease in the
price of conventional almond butter was enough to
foster substitution by consumers of almond butters
made with conventional almonds for organic almond
butter.
General Comments on the Almond
Marketing Order
Each handler, at the conclusion of the interview,
was asked if s/he wanted to offer any observations on
the almond marketing order or on marketing of or-
ganic almonds that had not already been discussed.
Six of the handlers made additional observations, with
two commenting on marketing of organic almonds
and the other four reiterating criticisms of the market-
ing order.
One handler commented on alternative approaches
to marketing organic almonds. He indicated that trade
shows (natural food conferences) were the traditional
method for marketing organic products but that he
found the shows to be quite expensive relative to the
results. He has established a Web site for organic al-
monds that he feels has been far more cost effective
than any of the other approaches he has used.
The second set of handler comments about mar-
keting organic almonds concerned exports, imports,
and market development. One handler observed that
almost all organic almonds were exported between
1994 and 1998. High prices held back development
of domestic sales and slowed export sales. He noted
that three or four years ago some handlers held their
organic almonds in storage too long and ended up
selling them for the same price as conventional al-
monds. He stated that, thanks to recent increases in
the domestic use of organic almonds, handlers have
had no problem selling all of their output at premium
prices. There are potential problems with continuing
high prices, which include supply response and loss
of market outlets. The handler observed that some U.S.
manufacturers have recently imported lower priced
organic almonds from Italy. These developments will
put downward pressure on prices for California or-
ganic almonds.
The four handlers who commented on the
marketing order emphasized earlier points. One
handler (who is generally supportive of the marketing
order) pointed out that growers have no flexibility in
contributing funds to the marketing order (the
assessment is fixed at 2.5 cents per pound), that ABC
has more funds than it needs, and that it does not
help the producers who need it. Another handler saidGiannini Foundation Research Report 346
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that ABC “does not participate in the organic market.”
The other two handlers believe that ABC can have a
positive impact through research but not through
promotion or reserve programs.
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APPENDIX 1
The following five figures illustrate developments in
the California almond industry during the period
between 1980 and 2001: growth in acreage and
production, variability of average yields and
production, inverse relationships between total
production and average grower price and between price
and domestic per capita consumption, average yields
for major producing countries, and growth in
California’s share of world almond exports.
Figure 1.A1.  Bearing, Nonbearing, and Total Almond Acreage in California, 1980–2001


















Figure 1.A2.  Total Supply Divided into Ending Stocks, Domestic Consumption, and Exports, 1980–2000
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Source: California Department of Food and Agriculture, Agricultural Resource Directory, California, annual issues.
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Source: California Department of Food and Agriculture, Agricultural Resource Directory, California, annual issues;
USDA Economic Research Service, Fruit and Tree Nuts Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 2002.
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Figure 1.A5.  Average Yield Per Hectare of Principal Almond Producers Worldwide, 1980–2000
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Table 1.A1.  Production Research Projects Funded by the Almond Board of California in 2000–01
Project Title Project Leader Budget Type
Ant Management in Almonds Coviello $35,780 IPM/Conventional
Evaluation of Soft Insecticides and San
Jose Scale Daane $23,454 IPM
Biological Control of Ants Oi $9,080 IPM/Organic
Reducing Impact of Dormant Sprays Wilson $4,000 Environmental
Alternative Dispensing Technologies for NOW Welter $33,269 Conventional
Insect and Mite Research Zalom $28,201 IPM
Potassium Critical Values and Orchard
Management Brown / Weinbaum $22,504 IPM
Almond Culture and Orchard Management Buchner $14,000 Misc. Project
Field Evaluation of Almond Rootstocks Connell $9,000 IPM
Self-Compatibility in Nonpareil Almonds Dandekar / Gradziel $15,054 Conventional
Physiological Assessment of Critical Value DeJong / Weinbaum $8,071 IPM
Continued Investigation into Bud Drop Duncan $9,400 IPM
Nickels Soil Lab Projects Edstrom $12,500 Misc. Project
Almond Variety Development Gradziel $52,500 IPM
Chipping/Shredding Pruning Hendricks / Duncan $8,470 IPM
Field Evaluation of Almond Varieties Micke $31,020 IPM
Almond Flower Development Polito $13,800 IPM
Epidemiology and Management of Anthracnose
and Brown Rot Adaskaveg $43,800 IPM/Conventional
Biology and Control of Lethal Phytophthora
Canker Browne $14,800 IPM/Organic
Bacterial Canker and Leaf Scorch Kirkpatrick $10,000 IPM
Epidemiology and Control of Alternaria
Leaf Spot Teviotdale $30,000 IPM
Effect of Tree Architecture on Alternaria Viveros $6,417 IPM
Honey Bee Management, Genetics and Breeding Page $18,000 IPM
Total $445,057
 Source: Almond Board of California.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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Table 1.A2.  Production Research Projects Funded by the Almond Board of California in 2001–02
Project Title Project Leader Budget Type
Evaluation of Soft Insecticides Daane $29,848 Conventional
Role of Natural Enemies Daane $28,306 IPM
Biological Control of Ants Oi $11,400 IPM
Reducing Impact of Dormant Sprays Wilson $4,000 Environmental
Insect and Mite Research Zalom $29,644 IPM
Xylella fastidiosa and Glassy Winged
Sharp Shooter Purcell $20,879 IPM
Self-Compatibility in Nonpareil Almonds Buchner $18,000 Conventional
Field Evaluation of Almond Rootstocks Connell $13,000 IPM
Self-Compatibility in Nonpareil Almond Dandekar $15,382 Conventional
Almond Variety Development Gradziel $56,100 IPM
Back Up Copy of Molecular Map Gradziel $3,200 IPM
Level of Susceptibility to Plum Pox Gradziel $8,400 IPM
Spur Dynamics and Almond Productivity Lampinen $14,287 IPM
Field Evaluation of Almond Varieties Lampinen $32,850 IPM
Blanchability Lampinen $2,000 IPM
Deficit Irrigation Management Shackel $26,630 IPM
Shaker Injury Shackel $7,125 IPM
Potassium Critical Values Brown / Weinbaum $23,709 IPM
Pollen Flow and Productivity Brown / Weinbaum $17,054 IPM
Bacterial Canker and Leaf Scorch Kirkpatrick $12,000 IPM
Epidemiology and Management of Silver Leaf Adaskaveg $10,800 IPM
Epidemiology and Management of Anthracnose
and Brown Rot Adaskaveg $43,300 Conventional
Biology and Control of Lethal Phytophthora
Canker Browne $16,900 IPM/Organic
Continued Investigation into Bud Drop Duncan $7,500 IPM
Epidemiology and Control of Alternaria
Leaf Spot Teviotdale $32,000 IPM/Conventional
Effect of Tree Architecture on Alternaria Viveros $6,417 IPM
Pollen Substitute Diets Schmidt $14,400 IPM
Europeans with AHB DeGrandi-Hoffman $10,460 IPM
Honey Bee Management, Genetics and Breeding Page $18,000 IPM
Varroa Mite Life Cycle Wardell / DeGrHoff $10,000 IPM
Total  $543,591
 Source: Almond Board of California.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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Table 1.A3.  Production Research Projects Funded by the Almond Board of California in 2002–03
Project Title Project Leader Budget Type
Biology/Ecology of SJS Parasitoids Daane $17,320 IPM
Leafroller and Leaffooted Daane $28,306 IPM
Glassy Winged Sharp Shooter Transmission
 of Xylella fastidiosa Purcell $23,091 IPM
Dormant Sprays Wilson $6,000 Environmental
Insect and Mite Research Zalom $36,102 IPM
Rootstocks Connell $13,000 IPM
Self-Compatibility in NP Dandekar $17,656 Conventional
Nickels Soil Lab Edstrom $18,750 Misc. Project
Almond Variety Development Gradziel $63,100 IPM
S-allele Combinations and Pollination Gradziel $12,600 IPM
Sonora Staining Gradziel $5,300 IPM
Farm Advisor Projects Krueger $15,000 Misc. Project
Spur Dynamics Lampinen $14,287 Conventional
Field Evaluation of Varieties Lampinen $32,850 IPM
Almond Pest Management Alliance Looker $38,000 IPM
Deficit Irrigation Shackel $26,630 IPM/Organic
Fox Squirrels Salmon $9,473 IPM
Crown Gall / Genetically Resistant Rootstock Sutter $24,200 Conventional
Anthracnose and Brown Rot Adaskaveg $43,300 Conventional
Silver Leaf Adaskaveg $10,800 IPM
Alternaria Adaskaveg $36,500 Conventional
Replant Disorder and Phytophthera Browne $16,950 IPM
Plum Pox Disease Gradziel $7,800 IPM
Bacterial Canker and Leaf Scorch Kirkpatrick $15,000 IPM
Tree Architecture and Alternaria Viveros $7,939 IPM
European Bee Maintenance Hoffman $15,650 IPM
Artificial Diet Hoffman $15,000 IPM
Varroa Mite Hoffman $13,000 IPM
Total $583,604
Source: Almond Board of California.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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C
alifornia kiwifruit producers are well organized
for marketing their crop. They secured legislative
approval to establish the California Kiwifruit Commis-
sion (CKC) in 1980 and then voted to establish a federal
marketing order for kiwifruit in October 1984. The
CKC authorizes promotion and research activities. The
federal marketing order, administered by the Kiwifruit
Administrative Committee (KAC), established manda-
tory minimum quality standards for grade, size, and
maturity. Quality standards were first used for Califor-
nia kiwifruit during the 1987–88 marketing year and
were extended to imports of fresh kiwifruit in 1990.
Individual handlers pay the mandatory inspection fees,
and both CKC and KAC activities are financed by an
assessment on all shipments of California kiwifruit.
The majority of the funds collected by assessment sup-
port CKC’s promotion activities. In both 1999–00 and
2000–01, for example, the total assessment was 22
cents per volume fill container (22 pounds per con-
tainer). In 1999–00, KAC received 5 cents and the
remaining 17 cents went to CKC. In 2000–01, KAC
received 3 cents and CKC received 19 cents. Based on
reported sales, producers and handlers paid approxi-
mately $524,500 in 2000–01 and $433,200 in
2001–02 in assessments.
Information on both organic and conventional ki-
wifruit is assembled and presented here with
comparisons where appropriate. Questions of equi-
table treatment of organic and conventional kiwifruit
by the marketing order are addressed where possible.
However, because the organic market is relatively new,
information on production and marketing of organic
kiwifruit is limited.
Production
Kiwifruit planting in California began during the 1960s
with a few acres. New Zealand exporters working with
Freida’s Finest, a Los Angeles based specialty crop
wholesaler, successfully established a premium priced
market for kiwifruit in the U.S. during the 1960s. Two
growers imported plants from New Zealand in the mid-
1960s to establish California’s first kiwifruit vineyards.
Nursery production of kiwifruit began in the Chico
area during the 1960s as well, and California plantings
totaled about 75 acres by 1970. Commercial produc-
tion was established in the 1970s. The California
Agricultural Statistics Service (CASS) first reported ki-
wifruit acreage data in 1974—405 acres, of which 56
were bearing and 349 were nonbearing. Two factors—
very high projected per-acre income10 and favorable
income tax treatment for development expenses—com-
bined to encourage rapid expansion of kiwifruit
plantings during the 1970s and early 1980s. Acreage
increases are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Most of the early
individual plantings were significantly small in scale
by California standards at one to five acres. As grow-
ers gained experience with the new crop, the acreage
and size of plantings expanded, resulting in a sustained
increase in kiwifruit acreage that extended through
1988. Total acreage peaked at 7,851 acres in 1988 and
bearing acreage peaked at 7,330 acres in 1990. As new
plantings diminished and existing plants were re-
moved, bearing acreage decreased to 4,867 in 1997
and has since ranged from 4,500 to 4,875 acres
(Table 2.1).
As new kiwifruit acreage came into production in
California and in other areas around the world, prices
began to drop. The record high production of more
than 52,000 tons in 1992 was accompanied by record
low average prices. In response, growers decreased new
plantings, removed marginal acreage, and investigated
alternative methods for reducing unit costs of produc-
tion and/or improving market returns. Severe price
pressures in the early 1990s encouraged some grow-
ers to convert their kiwifruit acreage to organic
production. Since the transition and certification pro-
cess for organic production by law requires three years,
significant production of organic kiwifruit is a recent
development.
Organic kiwifruit production in California is
feasible. There are usually few insects or diseases that
2. CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA ORGANIC KIWIFRUIT
10 One article, for example, described expected yields and prices during the early 1970s: “Conservative estimates for crop yield are
6,000 pounds per acre in the fourth year to 32,000 pounds per acre in the eighth year. Current wholesale prices average about $1 per
pound with retail prices set accordingly.” (Western Fruit Grower, March 1973).Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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cause major problems, weeds can be controlled
through cultural practices, and nutrient removal by
kiwifruit is minimal (Hasey et al. 1994). To determine
the economic feasibility of producing organic kiwifruit
in California, Hasey et al. (1997) compared a kiwifruit
vineyard that was converted to organic production with
a matched, conventionally farmed vineyard for three
crop years: 1990, 1991, and 1992. Costs and returns
were compared for the two vineyards for 1992, the
first year that the organic fruit qualified to be sold as
certified organic. Hasey et al. found that it cost more
to grow kiwifruit organically, with the difference in
cultural costs due mainly to higher costs for fertilizer
and weed control in the organic system. The organic
system yielded more per acre (meaning higher harvest
costs) than did the conventional system. In addition,
the organic kiwifruit suffered fewer repack losses and
received higher prices than did the conventional fruit.
Tests for post-harvest quality found that the organically
grown fruit was as firm as or firmer than conventionally
grown fruit, at harvest and four months after harvest.
No differences were evident in sweetness, as measured
by the percent-soluble-solids content. Total per-hectare
cultural and harvest costs were $7,785 for the organic
system and $7,066 for the conventional system. Of
the $719 difference, $105 was due to higher harvest
costs associated with the higher yield and $482 was
for voluntary third party certification and state
mandated registration fees for the organically grown
fruit.
Data on existing acreage and production of organic
kiwifruit are scarce. Growers of kiwifruit were identi-
fied from California Certified Organic Farmers’  CCOF
Membership Directory 2000–2001. Because some grow-
ers listed only kiwifruit and others listed multiple
crops, all growers listing multiple organic crops were
contacted for separate acreage estimates for kiwifruit.
A separate list identified nine handlers known to have
packed organic kiwifruit during the 2000–01 crop year.
Eight of those handlers provided an estimate of their
total pack and the acreage of organic kiwifruit oper-
ated by their growers. Based on the data gathered,
Figure 2.1.  California Kiwifruit Acreage, 1974–2001
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service, California Fruit & Nut Acreage, annual issues through 1996.
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20 organic kiwifruit producers operate on 290.5 acres.
This figure appears to represent nearly all of
California’s organic kiwifruit acreage. The California
Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) reported
297 acres of registered organic kiwifruit in 2002.11
Each of the eight handlers was asked for
observations on acreage and production trends for
California organic kiwifruit. Only one of the handlers
who also produce kiwifruit reported that his own
production would be increasing as new plantings
mature. None reported nonbearing vines or acreage in
transition. One handler reported being in contact with
a grower who was converting three to five acres of
kiwifruit to organic.
Despite the stability reported for their own opera-
tions, all of the handlers expect production and sales
of organic kiwifruit to increase in the future. Their ex-
pectations are based on higher yields anticipated from
maturation of relatively new organic plantings, new
plantings, conversions of conventional vineyards to
organic, and increased imports of organic kiwifruit.
One handler reported that a neighboring ranch with
11 Personal communication from Ray Green, CDFA, August 6, 2002.
Table 2.1.  California Kiwifruit: Bearing Acres, Average Yields, Production, and Average Price, 1980–2001
Average Total Production Grower
Crop Bearing Yield Production Utilized Price
Year Acres (tons/acre) (tons) (tons) ($ per ton)
1980 1,624 3.26 5,300 4,200 $2,400
1981 2,957 2.33 6,900 5,500 $2,000
1982 3,386 4.58 15,500 11,500 $920
1983 3,120 4.33 13,500 11,500 $1,240
1984 3,778 4.76 18,000 16,600 $1,070
1985 4,812 4.57 22,000 20,500 $813
1986 5,556 4.37 24,300 23,400 $1,030
1987 6,787 4.27 29,000 26,600 $710
1988 7,130 4.59 32,700 29,500 $760
1989 7,179 5.57 40,000 37,000 $400
1990 7,330 5.32 39,000 34,000 $415
1991 7,292 4.06 29,600 26,800 $820
1992 7,300 7.16 52,300 47,700 $290
1993 7,200 6.83 49,200 44,600 $370
1994 6,900 5.71 39,400 37,500 $491
1995 6,600 5.73 37,800 33,600 $459
1996 6,500 4.85 31,500 28,000 $470
1997 4,867* 7.19* 35,000 31,800 $518
1998 4,603* 7.95* 36,600 33,000 $744
1999 4,500* 6.00* 27,000 24,000 $634
2000 4,875* 6.97* 34,000 30,500 $455
2001 4,595* 5.60* 25,800 23,000 $667
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service, California Fruit & Nut Acreage, annual issues. Bearing acreage and average yield from 1997 to 2001 (*) were calculated from
information provided by CKC.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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100 acres of kiwifruit was converting to organic pro-
duction. Conversion of all 100 of those acres would
increase California organic acreage by one third. The
same handlers agreed that the increased availability of
organic kiwifruit will place downward pressure on
prices.
CKC issues kiwifruit industry shipment system
(KISS) reports during the marketing year that include
data on the total crop broken down by package and
fruit size. Information is provided in the form of tray
equivalents based on a minimum tray weight of seven
pounds as the conversion factor. Beginning with the
2000–01 crop, CKC began issuing separate reports
for the total crop and for the organic portion of it.
These reports provide the first detailed estimates of
California organic kiwifruit production and market-
ing practices. The KISS summary for the 2000–01 crop
year reported a total estimated marketable crop of
7,493,293 tray equivalents, of which 397,723 were
organic. Thus, organic kiwifruit accounted for 5.3 per-
cent of the year’s total marketable production.
Production for 2001–02 dropped to 5,834,847 tray
equivalents, of which 353,806 were organic. With the
smaller overall crop, the organic share of production
increased slightly to almost 6.1 percent.
Consumption and Demand
Total and per capita U.S. consumption of kiwifruit has
grown substantially since 1985, when 33.4 million
pounds (0.14 pounds per capita) were consumed. Total
U.S. consumption grew almost fivefold by 2001, reach-
ing 166.4 million pounds, a per capita consumption
of 0.56 pounds. Imports of 112 million pounds ac-
counted for about 67 percent of that total. Hanawa et
al. estimated an annual price elasticity of demand
(–2.542) but they were unable to obtain a satisfactory
estimate of the income elasticity of demand because
of the high correlation between variables, including
price, income, and per capita consumption.
Organic kiwifruit have typically commanded a pre-
mium market price, but the premium has decreased
over time as production and imports have increased.
The organic kiwifruit handlers in this study reported
the organic premium to be 15 to 50 percent, depend-
ing on the style of pack, fruit quality, and time of year.
Single layer flats of U.S. No. 1 grade organic kiwifruit
tend to have the highest price per pound. The most
often mentioned premiums were between 20 and 30
percent. Five of the eight handlers reported that or-
ganic kiwifruit prices tend to be more variable than
prices for conventional kiwifruit. Two handlers reported
that the price differential tends to increase as the sea-
son progresses and is greatest from February through
March. Another handler reported that he tended to get
the highest organic prices early in the season.
Despite the price premium, it is not unusual for
organic kiwifruit to be sold as conventional at the con-
ventional price. Five of the eight handlers reported that
they have occasionally sold organic kiwifruit in the
conventional market. This may be due to the seasonal
price variability mentioned above or, in some cases,
to market channel requirements. For example, one
handler sells only his highest quality kiwifruit as or-
ganic and markets the remainder as conventional even
though it meets organic standards. Another handler
said that he turns to the conventional market when he
considers the conventional price to be high enough.
Imports and Exports
Kiwifruit imports and exports are a significant factor
in seasonal marketing and pricing patterns. A number
of factors, in addition to seasonality of supply and
demand, have interacted to determine U.S. kiwifruit
imports and exports over time. Note in Figure 2.2 that
three important trends are evident. First, total U.S. con-
sumption of kiwifruit has increased significantly over
time. Second, except for a pause during the 1991
through 1994 period, the role of imports in total U.S.
consumption has increased over time. Kiwifruit im-
ports have exceeded exports since 1985 and the U.S.
continues to be a net importer of kiwifruit. Finally,
U.S. exports of kiwifruit have decreased over time. The
reduction in kiwifruit imports that occurred from 1991
through 1994 resulted from two actions initiated by
the California kiwifruit industry. First, the federal mar-
keting order’s minimum quality standards became
applicable to imports of fresh kiwifruit in 1990. This
had no impact on imports from New Zealand, which
already met the standards. It had a significant restric-
tive impact on imports from Europe in general (andMarketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
35
Italy in particular) and an even greater impact on Chile,
from which shipments of immature fruit were restricted.
Then, following low prices during the 1990–91 sea-
son, CKC filed an anti-dumping petition against the
New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board. After finding
in favor of the California industry, the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC) required a cash or
bond deposit of 98.6 percent of the shipment value
for every tray of New Zealand kiwifruit imported into
the U.S. for two seasons, beginning in May 1992. The
deposit rate was reduced to 11 percent for the 1994–
95 season and was removed in 2000. Beginning in
1992, Chile replaced New Zealand as the leading sup-
plier of kiwifruit imports in the U.S.
No data describing the role of organic kiwifruit in
exports and imports were available. Some organic
handlers indicated that they had previously exported
organic kiwifruit to several markets, including Canada
and Japan, but that they were not able to compete with
Italian production in European markets. Only two
handlers reported organic exports during the 2000–
01 marketing year, and the volumes made up less than
10 percent of their packs. Domestic organic kiwifruit
compete with organic imports, and the competition is















indicate that both Chile
and New Zealand will be
expanding production
and exports of organic
kiwifruit. FAS did not
have estimates of the
amount of organic kiwi-
fruit produced in Chile but did indicate that fresh
organic kiwifruit production is expected to expand and
that target markets are the U.S. and Japan. (USDA FAS
1998). Zespri International, the marketing agency for
New Zealand kiwifruit, has been encouraging New
Zealand growers to convert to organic production. New
Zealand produced almost 4,900 metric tons of organic
kiwifruit in 1999 (about 2.5 percent of the country’s
total production) and the organic share is projected to
grow to 10 percent by 2005. Recently, New Zealand
has been exporting more than half of its organic kiwi-
fruit to Japan and shipping the remainder to Europe
and the U.S. Prices for New Zealand’s organic kiwi-
fruit sold in Europe, Japan, and the U.S. have recently
ranged from 8 to 15 percent above prices received for
conventional fruit. The premium for imported organic
kiwifruit has generally decreased as the organic share
of total kiwifruit production has increased.
Marketing Patterns
Kiwifruit are picked when they are firm but not yet
ripe. California kiwifruit can be harvested in Septem-
ber, but most of the fruit is picked from mid-October
Figure 2.2.  U.S. Kiwifruit: Production, Consumption, Exports, and Imports,
1985–2001


























Exports Consumption Imports Production
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 1985Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
36
through the end of Novem-
ber. The fruit must mature
on the vine and reach a
minimum soluble-solids
requirement of 6.2 percent
to 6.5 percent before being
harvested to achieve ideal
sweetness levels once they
are ripe. Kiwifruit that re-
main on the vine longer,
reaching a higher soluble-
solids level, will taste
sweeter when ripe and also
tend to store better, making
the fruit easier to handle and
more appealing to consum-
ers. The kiwifruit are placed
in field bins that are deliv-
ered to packing facilities
where the fruit is cooled and
packed into various con-
tainers according to fruit size. The packed fruit is then
placed in cold storage pending shipment. When the
fruit is removed from storage to be shipped, it is
checked and damaged fruits are replaced. When
shipped early in the season, conventional kiwifruit may
receive an ethylene treatment to assist ripening at the
time of shipment. Organic kiwifruit cannot be treated.
California kiwifruit are typically marketed during
the eight-month period from October through May,
and there is usually competition with Southern Hemi-
sphere imports during April, May, October, and
November when the marketing seasons overlap.
The monthly KISS reports include estimates of the
volume of packed kiwifruit by container type that has
Table 2.2.  A Comparison of Containers Used to Pack Organic and Conventional California Kiwifruit,
2000–01 and 2001–02 Crop Years
2000–01 2001–02
Organic Conventional Organic Conventional
Container Trays Trays Trays Trays
Single-Layer Trays 65,147 192,290 44,755 110,110
3-Layer Trays 20,920 371,808 13,281 104,631
Bags 68,488 66,698 74,531 60,549
Volume Fills 176,311 5,908,481 164,560 4,798,162
125 Pound Bins 64,153 316,462 56,679 209,428
 Other 2,665 239,830 0 198,160
Total 397,723 7,095,570 353,806 5,481,041
The minimum weight of a tray has been set at seven pounds, which is the conversion factor used by the industry to calculate the volume of kiwifruit in tray equivalents (TE).
Source: California Kiwifruit Commission, KISS report, June 11, 2001, and April 30, 2002.
Figure 2.3.  Distribution of Organic and Conventional Kiwifruit Pack by
Container, California Average for 2000–01 and 2001–02 Crop Years
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been sold and remains in storage. Common shipping
containers include single-layer trays (the premium
package), three-layer cartons, cartons with 21-pound
film bags, 22-pound volume-fill cartons, and 125-
pound bulk bins. The distribution of the kiwifruit pack
by container type for 2000–01 and 2001–02 is shown
in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2. Volume-fill cartons are
currently the most popular container, accounting for
85 percent of the estimated 2001–02 total crop. Single-
layer trays accounted for just 2.65 percent of that crop,
which represents a significant change from previous
years. In 1987–88, for example, more than 80 percent
of the crop was packed in single-layer trays and only
about 8 percent was packed in volume-fill cartons. This
change in shipping containers is due in part to differ-
ences in packing and container costs. Currently, the
cost for volume-fill cartons is about 40 percent of the
cost for single-layer trays. Also, increasing consump-
tion has increased demand for containers holding more
fruit.
There are significant differences in the sizes of con-
tainers in which conventional and organic kiwifruit
are typically packed. Conventional kiwifruit handlers
have recently packed 85 percent of their produce in
volume-fill cartons but organic handlers have used vol-
ume fill for only about 44 percent. Organic handlers
use a wider variety of packaging, with about 16 per-
cent of their organic kiwifruit packed in single-layer
trays, 17 percent in one-pound film bags, and 16 per-
cent in 125-pound bins. The distribution of package
types for organic kiwifruit is based on the more spe-
cialized nature of the market and the premium price.
The eight organic handlers interviewed were asked
to identify their buyers and describe how their cus-
tomer mixes differ from that of conventional kiwifruit
handlers. While organic and conventional kiwifruit are
sold to many of the same customers (large chains, spe-
cialty stores, institutional buyers, etc.), there are some
important differences in their marketing outlets. The
largest volume of organic kiwifruit is sold to organic
wholesalers and distributors who service retailers that
stock organic products. Some handlers have estab-
lished relationships with small and mid-sized chains
that tend to specialize in organic foods. One handler
commented that “organic customers differ from con-
ventional customers in that they order smaller
quantities and often use a common distributor or
buying office that provides the mix of organic pro-
duce that their individual stores require.” Another
commented that “the natural food and normal food
stores that buy organic kiwifruit expect better quality.”
Three of the handlers said that they had on occasion
sold organic kiwifruit to large chain buyers but none
listed large national chains as their primary outlet.
Seasonal Shipment Patterns
As noted earlier, the California kiwifruit harvest be-
gins in September, with significant shipments to retail
markets beginning in early October. Sales typically pro-
ceed slowly during October and November because
of competing fruit from Chile and New Zealand. Sales
build through December, typically peak in January, re-
main high during February and March, and then
decrease significantly in April and May. Though im-
ported kiwifruit are typically present in the market
throughout the year, significant shipments from the
new crop in the Southern Hemisphere begin to arrive
in April and May. There may be small shipments of
domestic kiwifruit during June, July, and August, but
an abundance of new-crop imports significantly weak-
ens the price for older fruit. The actual pattern of
shipments varies from year to year as a result of crop
size, the pattern and volume of imports, and price
trends.
Hanawa et al. found that monthly prices follow the
reverse of the monthly marketing pattern—prices are
high at the beginning of the marketing season and
decrease as volume increases. Prices generally recover
toward the end of the marketing season as volume
decreases but seldom exceed the initial price. Hanawa
et al. also examined alternative marketing patterns for
the 1986–87 through 1994–95 period and, based on
their assumptions, found that producers could increase
total crop revenues by shifting sales toward the begin-
ning of the season. That reallocation of seasonal sales
generated peak sales in November and decreased sales
thereafter. Average prices in their model increased in
line with storage costs. This price pattern existed from
1992 to 1997, when New Zealand was under the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s anti-dumping order, which
reduced competition early in the season, and ChileGiannini Foundation Research Report 346
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imports, and (2) the greater storability of organic
kiwifruit, which is typically picked later and at a higher
sugar content than the bulk of conventional kiwifruit.
The difference in shipping during the 2000–01 crop
year may be due in part to market conditions during
the first three months of that season. Handlers
interviewed in November and
December 2001 expressed
concern about the large
quantity of New Zealand
kiwifruit still in the market
and the effects of late imports
on prices. Based on the
shipment data, it appears that
organic handlers delayed sales
more than conventional
handlers did while waiting





minimum grade, size, and
maturity standards for all
varieties of kiwifruit grown in
California, with inspection to
was shipping immature
fruit toward the end of the
season. Now, seasonal
patterns are less predict-
able. The dumping order
has been lifted, allowing
imports from New
Zealand to resume, and
Chile no longer ships
early, immature fruit.
Average monthly
shipments of organic and
conventional kiwifruit
for California’s 2000–01
and 2001–02 crop years
are shown in Figure 2.4
and Table 2.3. Organic
kiwifruit were shipped
later in the season than
were conventional kiwifruit, a situation that is
consistent with industry participants’ descriptions of
previous marketing patterns. An observed tendency
to market organic kiwifruit later in the year was
attributed to (1) less competition for organic fruit at
the end of the marketing season when there are less
Table 2.3.  A Comparison of Monthly Sales for Organic and Conventional Kiwifruit,
California, 2000–01 and 2001–02 Crop Years
2000–01 2001–02
Organic Conventional Organic Conventional
Container Trays Trays Trays Trays
October 19,664 1,041,222 23,193 652,218
November 20,876 1,029,587 39,083 946,469
December 35,477 982,297 39,919 1,024,248
January 53,956 1,545,354 59,084 1,249,387
February 110,819 1,557,051 59,584 824,959
March 85,801 819,788 59,753 659,255
April 57,742 119,045 55,965 92,081
May 13,388 1,226 17,225 32,424
Total 397,723 7,095,570 353,806 5,481,041
Source: California Kiwifruit Commission, KISS reports, June 11, 2001, and April 30, 2002.
Figure 2.4.  A Comparison of Average Monthly Sales for Organic
and Conventional Kiwifruit, California, 2000–01 and 2001–02 Crop Years
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be done by either the federal or federal-state inspection
service. The minimum grade for fresh shipments of
kiwifruit is KAC No. 1 quality; the minimum size is
45, which is defined as a maximum of 55 pieces of
fruit in an eight-pound sample; and the maturity
standard specifies a minimum 6.2 percent soluble-
solids content at the time of inspection. The regulations
also specify pack requirements, container marking
regulations, inspection and certification requirements,
exemptions, assessments, inspection fees, and
reporting requirements.
There was some controversy over the mandatory
grade standards when they first became effective. Freida
Caplan, who was instrumental in developing the U.S.
market for kiwifruit, was very critical of the names
assigned to the grades.12 Handlers who had developed
an outlet for kiwifruit shaped like “fans” were unhappy
that those fruit could no longer be shipped since they
did not meet the grade standards for shape. The initial
grade designations were revised, and accumulating
evidence suggests that minimum grade standards have
been effective in increasing demand for California
kiwifruit. KAC, in its most
recently issued marketing
policy statement, discusses
improvements in quality over
time associated with the use
of mandatory minimum
quality standards. The
statement points to trade
surveys of U.S. retailers
conducted in 1993–1994
and 1995–96. The surveys
indicate a high level of
satisfaction with the quality
of California kiwifruit and
discuss increases in kiwifruit
sales in Eastern Canada
associated with improved
quality for Italian imports.
Ferguson and Carman
(1999) empirically examined
the effects of minimum
maturity standards on the
average price differential between kiwifruit from
California and New Zealand. In their analysis of
terminal market price data, they found that the early
season price premium that New Zealand fruit enjoyed
over California fruit decreased significantly in eight
out of 20 cases in terminal markets in Boston, Los
Angeles, and Philadelphia after minimum maturity
standards were imposed for California kiwifruit. Their
results are consistent with the proposition that the
standards corrected a problem of asymmetric
information on the sweetness of California kiwifruit
in those markets, resulting in increased prices to
California producers.
Size Distribution
The degree to which the federal marketing order’s mini-
mum grade and size requirements are equitable is
sometimes questioned, particularly since cultural meth-
ods and production conditions can impact the shape
and size distribution of fruit. An important question
for this study was whether minimum grade and size
12 From a speech by Freida Caplan to the Joint Annual Meeting of the Kiwifruit Growers of California, the California Kiwifruit
Commission, and the Kiwifruit Administrative Committee, Sacramento, CA, January 18, 1986.
Figure 2.5.  All Kiwifruit Distribution by Size, California, 1997–98 through
2001–02
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standards impact organic and conventional kiwifruit
equally. Comparing the size distribution of organic
and conventional kiwifruit for the most recent crop
provides a partial answer (partial because no data were
available on the amount of kiwifruit culled for not
meeting grade and size standards).
The quantity of organic and conventional kiwifruit
in each size category and the percentage distributions
by size are shown in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.5. The
column for fruit size in Table 2.4 refers to the number
of kiwifruit required to fill a standard single-layer tray.
For example, size 25 refers to 25 fruit to a tray and
size 45 to 45 fruit to a tray. Therefore, size 25 is larger
than size 45 because it takes fewer fruit to fill the same
size tray. As previously noted, the minimum weight of
a tray has been set at seven pounds, which is the
conversion factor used by the industry to calculate
the volume of kiwifruit in tray equivalents. Careful
comparisons of the percentage size distributions show
that for the most recent crop year conventional
kiwifruit tended to be larger on average than organic
kiwifruit. Looking at cumulative percentages for 2000–
01, only 2.8 percent of organic kiwifruit were size 30
or larger, while 12.86 percent of conventional kiwifruit
were size 30 or larger. At the other end of the scale, 52
percent of organic and 41 percent of conventional
kiwifruit were size 39 and smaller. In 2001–02, 5.8
percent of organic and 19 percent of conventional
kiwifruit were size 30 or larger. That same year, 60.4
percent of organic and 48 percent of conventional
kiwifruit were size 39 and smaller. The two-year average
cumulative size distributions for organic and
conventional kiwifruit are shown in Figure 2.6. The
two-year average distribution by size is shown in Figure
2.7. The smaller average size for organic kiwifruit that
is evident in both years is consistent with conventional
wisdom in the industry.
Organic handlers were asked if they had alternative
markets for lower grade and substandard kiwifruit. A
variety of responses indicated that there is not much
of a market for culls. The handler that sells only U.S.
No. 1 grade organic kiwifruit sells lower grade fruit to
conventional markets. Two of the handlers sell lower
grade fruit at roadside stands or farmers markets. Five
of the handlers dispose of the culls (throw them away,
put them back in the field, or dump them) and one
has an outlet that uses the culls for juice concentrate.
Table 2.4.  Distribution by Size of California Organic and Conventional Kiwifruit, 2000–01 and 2001–02
2000–01 2001–02
Fruit Organic Conventional Organic Conventional
Size Fruit Trays Fruit Trays Fruit Trays Fruit Trays
20 or 21 0 0 0 489
25 1,104 36,680 663 101,658
27 or 28 3782 241,702 6,095 239,474
30 6,255 633,484  13,892 701,455
33 54,778 1,177,297 33,410 886,656
36 123,950 2,100,655 85,951 918,147
39 103,265 1,526,639 76,346 988,400
42 23,946 457,314 28,965 574,642
45 80,643 921,799 108,483 1,070,219
Total 397,723 7,095,570 353,805 5,481,041
The minimum weight of a tray has been set at seven pounds, which is the conversion factor used by the industry to calculate the volume of kiwifruit in tray equivalents (TE).
Source: California Kiwifruit Commission, KISS reports, June 11, 2001, and April 30, 2002.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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Organic Handler/Producer
Views on the Marketing Order
Organic kiwifruit handlers were asked for their views
on the federal kiwifruit marketing order’s provisions,
which mainly regulate and enforce mandatory
minimum quality standards for grade, size, and
maturity. Organic and conventional
kiwifruit must satisfy the same
standards. As noted above, the size
distribution for organic kiwifruit
is smaller than conventional kiwifruit,
which can pose grading problems for
organic handlers and producers.
Handlers expressed a variety of
opinions on the value of minimum
quality standards for organic kiwi-
fruit. Two of the smallest producer/
handlers, who market only their own
fruit, said that the minimum size re-
quirement tended to result in more
culls for organic than for conven-
tional fruit. One, however, added that
the economic impact was minimal
because organic consumers would
not buy the small-cull fruit anyway.
Four of the eight handlers were very
positive about and supportive of ex-
isting quality standards. They stated
that the quality standards help them
sell their organic kiwifruit by help-
ing to maintain consistent quality and
by giving buyers confidence in the
product. These four handlers also be-
lieve that current standards are fair.
Another handler criticized the matu-
rity standard as setting the sugar level
too low (the average minimum ma-
turity of 6.5 percent soluble solids
was reduced to 6.2 percent for the
2000–01 season).
The organic kiwifruit handlers
interviewed expressed great concern
about the quality of their pack. One
handler described “the market
evolution for organic kiwifruit as
beginning with customers who were most concerned
about farming practices. As consumers became
acquainted with organic kiwifruit, they came to
appreciate the taste but were not too concerned with
appearance.” Now, his customers want fruit that tastes
good and also is free from blemishes. Another handler
commented that “given a choice, customers prefer and
Figure 2.6.  Cumulative Distribution of Organic and Conventional
Kiwifruit by Size, California Average of 2000–01 and 2001–02
Crop Years
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Figure 2.7.  Average Kiwifruit Distribution by Size, California,
2000–01 and 2001–02 Crop Years
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are willing to pay for less cosmetically challenged fruit.”
Several handlers indicated that organic consumers are
a quality-conscious and premium market segment that
demands higher quality than conventional buyers.
Statements such as “my consumers set the standards,
which are above the minimum standards” were
common. As previously noted, one handler markets
only his U.S. No. 1 organic kiwifruit as organic; the
rest is sold as conventional.
Organic Handler
Views on CKC
While the programs administered by CKC and KAC
are separate, most producers and handlers tend to think
of them as one. This is not surprising given that the
two programs are combined for administrative pur-
poses, collect a combined assessment, and are operated
out of the same office. Handlers were asked if CKC’s
advertising and promotion programs help them mar-
ket organic kiwifruit and if the handlers do any
advertising of their own. All but one of the handlers
said that the present CKC advertising and promotion
program does not help market organic kiwifruit. One
handler commented that past CKC advertising and pro-
motion had helped market both organic and
conventional kiwifruit, but with smaller budgets and
reduced efforts, the present impact is small. He also
commented that CKC does a very good job with a
limited budget. Another commented that CKC’s pro-
grams are oriented to conventional kiwifruit, do not
help market organic kiwifruit, and are a waste of time
and money.
Four of the eight handlers interviewed spend a
moderate amount of their own money advertising their
organic kiwifruit. All of the expenditures are for in-
dustry publications (organic directories, The Packer)
directed toward the trade to inform wholesalers and
other buyers about the availability of organic kiwifruit.
None advertises to consumers.
Suggested Marketing Program
Improvements
When organic kiwifruit handlers were asked about
improvements they would like to see in the CKC and
KAC programs, they offered the following responses.
 All California kiwifruit is at a disadvantage against
imports because USDA does not have the cour-
age to make foreign suppliers adhere to our
quality criteria.
 Advertising and promotion should stress the
need to buy only California-grown fruit.
 Reducing costs to growers would be an improve-
ment.
 It would be nice if the commission could have
more money but this is unrealistic.
 There should be programs specific to organic
kiwifruit, such as point-of-purchase materials and
Web site items.
 It is good for the industry to have as much data
and information as possible on organic devel-
opments (KISS reports plus actual and projected
acreage and production).
 CKC could put an organic section on its Web
site.
 People in the Midwest do not seem to be aware
of organic products. I would like to have an ad-
vertising program to show people the
advantages.
 I would like to see some organic advertising and
point-of-sale materials.
 Need to promote organic fruit.
 A good way to advertise organic fruit is with the
PLU sticker. CKC designed a sticker for conven-
tional fruit but not for organic.
 A different grade designation for organic would
be interesting.
 There should be different standards for organic.
 Sugar levels are too low. There should be a higher
minimum maturity standard.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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Data and Information Sources
Information and data on both organic and conven-
tional kiwifruit are assembled and presented with
comparisons where appropriate. Questions of equi-
table treatment of organic and conventional kiwifruit
by the marketing order are addressed where possible.
However, because organic production is relatively new,
information on production and marketing of organic
kiwifruit is limited. Statistics on California kiwifruit
acreage, production, and prices are available from CASS,
and CKC publishes KISS (kiwifruit industry shipment
system) reports during the marketing season. The KISS
reports, which contain data on estimated crop volume
and distribution of fruit by size and package, began to
include data on organic production and marketing with
the 2000 crop year. The published data were supple-
mented by interviews with organic kiwifruit handlers.
Eight of the nine handlers who pack organic kiwifruit
were interviewed. Cooperating handlers were asked
about the size of their operations, their marketing prac-
tices, their views on the impact of the marketing order
for kiwifruit, and if there were changes that they would
like to see made in the marketing order.
Development of California’s Kiwifruit Industry
California kiwifruit production is a comparatively
recent development, with commercial quantities of the
crop available only since the early 1970s.13 Originally
known as the Chinese gooseberry, kiwifruit is a de-
ciduous vine crop native to China’s Yangtze Valley. It
was introduced to New Zealand in 1906 as the Chi-
nese gooseberry and when commercial exports began
in 1953 it was renamed “kiwi” because of the fruit’s
superficial resemblance to New Zealand’s native bird.
In 1974, kiwifruit became the internationally accepted
name.
California’s original kiwifruit plants were received
at the U.S. Plant Introduction Station at Chico,
California, from a New Zealand grower in 1935. It took
until the 1960s for the station to develop cultural
methods and encourage growers to experiment with
new plantings. California’s acreage of the crop
remained small until New Zealand exporters working
with Freida’s Finest, a Los Angeles based specialty crop
wholesaler, successfully established a premium priced
market for kiwifruit in the U.S. during the 1960s. Two
growers imported plants from New Zealand in the mid-
1960s to establish the first kiwifruit vineyards in
California. Nursery production of kiwifruit began in
the Chico area during the 1960s and California
plantings totaled about 75 acres by 1970. Two factors—
very high projected per-acre income14 and favorable
income tax treatment for development expenses—
combined to encourage rapid expansion of kiwifruit
plantings during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Published data on development of the California
kiwifruit industry are limited for years prior to 1980,
when CKC was established. CASS published bearing
and nonbearing acreage data for 1974 through 1992.
Their estimates of annual plantings that were standing
in a given year permit estimates of plantings from 1970
through 1992. A consistent series of annual production
and grower returns is available beginning in 1980. Note
that nonbearing acreage estimates are not available after
1992. It is likely, however, that nonbearing acreage has
remained low since then due to relatively low prices
for kiwifruit. Going back to the first reported acreage
data, CASS recorded 405 acres of kiwifruit in 1974,
consisting of 56 acres bearing and 349 acres
nonbearing. Relatively numerous new plantings
through 1982 led to increases in nonbearing and total
acreage. Most of the early individual plantings were
on a very small scale by California standards, ranging
from one to five acres. As growers gained experience
with the new crop, the acreage and size of new plantings
expanded. Then, as the new plantings began to
produce, there was a sustained increase in bearing
acreage that extended through 1988. Total kiwifruit
APPENDIX 2
13 The development sequence for kiwifruit is described by Beutel et al. (1976).
14 One article, for example, described expected yields and prices during the early 1970s: “Conservative estimates for crop yield are
6,000 pounds per acre in the fourth year to 32,000 pounds per acre in the eighth year. Current wholesale prices average about $1 per
pound with retail prices set accordingly.” (Western Fruit Grower, March 1973).Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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acreage peaked at 7,851 acres in 1988, and bearing
acreage peaked at 7,330 acres in 1990. With limited
planting and increased removals, bearing acreage
decreased to 5,300 acres in 1998.
Even though California kiwifruit was produced and
marketed through the 1970s, CASS first reported pro-
duction and price data in 1980. Initially, there were
4,200 tons utilized from a total crop of 5,300 tons,
resulting in an average grower price of $1.20 per pound
(Figure 2.A1). Based on press reports and promotional
literature, grower returns of $1.00 per pound for kiwi-
fruit were the norm through the 1970s. Favorable
returns persisted, with a 1981 average price of $1.00
per pound. This was the last year that producer re-
turns were $1.00 per pound or more. A sharp increase
in production in 1982 reduced average grower prices
to $0.46 per pound. Since then, grower prices have
ranged from a high of $0.62 per pound in 1983 to a
low of $0.145 per pound with record high produc-
tion in 1992. Grower returns have improved since
1992, as both acreage and production have decreased.
There is generally an inverse relationship between ki-
wifruit production and average price, as shown in
Figure 2.A1.
Total annual kiwifruit production is larger than
utilized production, as shown in Figure 2.A1, since a
portion of the fruit is culled in the packing process.
As the industry was developing, culls had limited use
and most were wasted. Recently, cull purchases by juice
concentrate makers have provided limited returns to
growers.
The percentage of total production that is utilized
has tended to increase over time. During the four-year
period from 1980 through 1983, slightly less than 80
percent of the crop was utilized, but this increased to
more than 90 percent in 1984 and has averaged about
91 percent for the 16-year period from 1984 through
1999.
Average yields have also varied and increased over
time, but they continue to be well below the double-
digit figures touted by some early industry promoters.
Per-acre average industry yields have ranged from a
low of 2.33 tons per acre in 1981 to a high of 7.16
tons per acre in 1992. Average yields topped five tons
per acre for the first time in 1989 and after that aver-
aged 5.87 tons per acre through 1998. Recent average
yields of 6.6 tons per acre in 1997 and 6.9 tons per
acre in 1998 are near the top of Beutel et al.’s predicted
yield range of four to seven tons per acre for full-bear-
ing, ten-year-old kiwifruit vineyards (1976).
Kiwifruit acreage has been rather widely distributed
throughout California, with CASS reporting 7,117 acres
in 1992 that were located in 36 of California’s 58
counties. The 1992 Agricultural Census reported that
699 farms had 7,164 acres of kiwifruit, an average of
10.25 acres per farm. The total acreage decreases shown
in Figure 2.A1 appear to have been concentrated in
the smallest kiwifruit farms. The 1997 Agricultural
Census reported 5,854 acres distributed among 449
farms, an average of 13.03 acres per farm. The 250
farms that exited kiwifruit production between 1992
and 1997, therefore, were small, averaging 5.24 acres
per farm.
A comparison of CASS and census data shows that
kiwifruit acreage became more geographically
concentrated as it decreased. According to the 1997
census, kiwifruit acreage was concentrated in the
northern Sacramento Valley (Butte, Sutter, and Yuba
Counties had 35.5 percent of total acreage) and the
southern San Joaquin Valley (Fresno, Tulare, Kern, and
Kings Counties had 52.9 percent of total acreage).
Tulare County accounted for 1,533 acres and Butte
County for 1,475 acres, 51.4 percent of the total. The
limited data available on the size distribution of
kiwifruit farms show that most operations have less
than 15 acres and many have less than 5. The largest
operations were in Kings County and Kern County,
where plantings averaged 72 and 48 acres per farm
respectively. Average farm sizes for other major
producing counties were: Butte, 13 acres; Sutter, 8 acres;
Yuba, 15 acres; Fresno, 12 acres; and Tulare, 22 acres.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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Figure 2.A1.  California Kiwifruit Production and Average Prices, 1980–2000
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G
rowers and handlers of fresh winter pears (in-
cluding Anjou, Bosc, and other varieties) estab-
lished a federal marketing order in 1939, just two years
after the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA)
was passed. The order was last amended under formal
rulemaking on November 14, 1997. The Winter Pear
Control Committee (WPCC), which administers the
marketing order, is comprised of 12 members (half
are growers and half are shippers) who are elected from
the four pear-growing districts.
Originally, the order included all growers and ship-
pers of fresh winter pears in California, Oregon, and
Washington. In October 1997, however, California,
which produces few winter pears, withdrew from the
marketing order. Thus, the order now includes only
northwest winter pears. WPCC contracts its consumer
research and advertising activities to Pear Bureau North-
west (PBN).
Another federal order, the Northwest Fresh Bartlett
Pear Marketing Order, regulates Bartlett pears grown
in Oregon and Washington. In addition, a state mar-
keting order (the Oregon Bartlett Pear Commission)
regulates Bartlett pears grown in Oregon.
Data and Information Sources
Information on conventional pears (acreage, produc-
tion, and prices) is available from the National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). In addition,
WPCC publishes annual statistics on conventional win-
ter pears. PBN provided data on organic pears that
were shipped in 2001–02 and estimates for 2002–03.
Three reports from Granatstein (Granatstein 2000a,
Granatstein 2000b, and Granatstein and Kirby 2002)
provide recent international, national, and state data
on organic pears (acreage, production, and prices) and
details on Washington organic pears.
Fifteen organic winter pear handlers were identi-
fied, and phone interviews were conducted with nine
of them during July, August, and September 2002. Han-
dlers were asked about the size of their operations,
their marketing practices, their views on the impact of
the marketing order for winter pears, and changes they
would like to see made in the marketing order.
Production
Fourteen million tons of pears were produced world-
wide in 2000. China is the world’s largest pear
producing country; its 8.5 million tons represent al-
most 60 percent of total global production (Figure
3.1). The other pear producing countries lag far be-
hind at less than 10 percent of global production each.
For many years, Italy was the second largest producer,
followed closely by the U.S. In 2000, the U.S. finally
surpassed Italy, producing 7 percent of world supply
compared to Italy’s 6 percent. Spain and Argentina are,
respectively, the fourth and fifth largest pear produc-
ers at 5 percent and 4 percent. Because data are not
available for all countries, worldwide acreages are not
presented in this report.
U.S. Pear Production
European colonists brought pears to North America,
and large orchards were established throughout the
United States, especially in New England. However,
fire blight, a European bacterial disease of apples and
pears that kills blossoms, shoots, limbs, and some-
times entire trees, destroyed many orchards. U.S.
commercial pear production was then relocated from
the humid South and East to drier areas of the Pacific
Northwest where fire blight is less prevalent. Today,
conventional pears are grown commercially in nine
states (Washington, California, Oregon, New York,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Colorado, and
Utah in decreasing rank). However, three states, Wash-
ington, California, and Oregon, predominate both the
conventional and the organic pear industries; collec-
tively, they produce more than 95 percent of the U.S.
crop.
The U.S. commercially grows primarily European
varieties: summer pears (mainly Bartlett), fall pears
(such as Hardy), and winter pears, predominantly
Beurre d’Anjou (Anjou) and Beurre Bosc (Bosc) plus
Winter Nelis, Doyenne du Comice (Comice), Forelle,
Seckle, and red varieties of winter pears. Asian pears
are relatively new in the U.S. and represent only a small
portion of total production. About three-quarters of
3. CASE STUDY: NORTHWEST ORGANIC WINTER PEARSGiannini Foundation Research Report 346
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U.S. Bartlett pears are canned while almost all winter
pears are sold on the fresh market.
Bartlett pears made up 52 percent of the total U.S.
crop for 2001–02, a slight decrease compared to past
years (World Horticultural Trade and Export Opportuni-
ties, November 2001). In 2001, production of Bartlett
pears totaled 507,000 tons (USDA NASS).
U.S. Winter Pear Production
Between 70 and 75 percent of non-Bartlett pears
produced in the U.S. are winter pears. Therefore, al-
though data are not kept specifically on winter pear
acreages and yields nationwide, data for non-Bartlett
pears represent mostly winter pears and therefore win-
ter pear trends.
The bearing acreage of non-Bartlett pears in the U.S.
increased steadily between 1987 (22,500 acres) and
1996 (29,800 acres). Washington, Oregon, and par-
ticularly California contributed to this increase.
California more than doubled its relatively small acre-
age, increasing from 1,400 to 4,400. Since 1996, the
number of acres devoted to non-Bartlett pears has re-
mained fairly stable. In 2001, 30,200 acres nationwide
produced non-Bartlett pears. The vast majority of those
acres, 25,900, were located in the northwest—13,500
acres in Washington and 12,400 acres in Oregon
(USDA NASS).
Total non-Bartlett pear production in the U.S. in
2001 was 440,000 tons, of which Washington pro-
duced 57 percent, Oregon 36 percent, and California
7 percent. PBN reported that in 2001–02 winter pears
represented about 83 percent of total pear production
in Oregon and Washington (15,405,500 standard
boxes15). Of those pears, Anjous made up 73 percent
(11,209,000 boxes), followed by Boscs at 21 percent
(3,161,000 boxes).
In the last two decades, the nation’s five-year aver-
age production for non-Bartlett pears has increased
slowly from about 341,800 tons (1987–91) to about
433,000 tons (1997–2001) with variations year to year
(Figure 3.2). The absolute increase was greatest in
Washington due to increases there in average yield per
acre and some increase in acreage. Several problems
15 Quantities of pears reported in “standard boxes” or “boxes” in this section refer to actual standard western pear boxes. This box
weight range is from 42 to 48 pounds. Generally within the industry, a standard winter pear box is considered to contain 44 pounds.
Figure 3.1.  Pear Production in Selected Countries (million tons) in 2000–01
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in the apple industry in recent years (the Alar incident,
overproduction, etc.) encouraged many apple grow-
ers to switch to pear production.
Yields for non-Bartlett pears nationally have re-
mained steady since 1987, about 13.8 tons per acre.
Washington’s yields are high (16.4 tons per acre) and
have been increasing since 1987. In comparison,
California’s average yields are relatively low at 6.3 tons
per acre. Anjous are the dominant variety in Oregon
and Washington. California’s non-Bartlett varieties in
addition to Anjou include Bosc, Seckle, Comice, and
red pears.
Northwest Winter Pear Production
(Oregon and Washington)
In Oregon and Washington there are four areas
where winter pears are grown commercially: Medford
in Oregon; Wenatchee and Yakima, both in Washing-
ton; and the Mid-Columbia region (Hood River) in
northern Oregon and southern Washington. These four
districts have semi-arid conditions that are particularly
beneficial for winter pear production. The Wenatchee
and Mid-Columbia areas (especially the Hood River
area in Oregon) produce approximately 80 percent of
the northwest’s winter pears.
There are approximately 70 han-
dlers of winter pears in Oregon and
Washington, none of which are large
operations like their counterparts in
other commodity industries. Accord-
ing to PBN, the largest individual
shippers handle 6 to 8 percent of all
pears (all varieties included).
There are 1,640 pear growers in
Oregon and Washington and aver-
age acreage per grower is 25.5 (USDA
NASS and PBN). In fact, none of the
pear growers are large. Instead, there
are many small farmers. Approxi-
mately 1,500 growers produce
winter pears and 1,350 grow
Bartletts; three-fourths of the grow-
ers produce both varieties.
Organic Production
Granatstein (2000b, 2002) reported organic pear acre-
ages worldwide at 7,618 acres in 2001. No data were
available for China. Europe, home to 60 percent of
that acreage (3,665 acres) predominated (Table 3.1).
The U.S. followed with 1,630 acres in 2000 and 2,798
acres in 2001. Granatstein (2000b) reported 920 acres
of organic pears in Argentina in 2000, identifying it as
another large producer of organic pears, but a GAIN
report from USDA16 put the estimate for Argentina in
1999 much lower—234 acres of certified organic pears.
16 FAS GAIN (Global Agriculture Information Network) Report, USDA, Argentina Organic Products: Apples, Pears and Cherries, 2000.
Table 3.1.  Estimated Worldwide Acreage of Certified
Organic Pears, 2000 and 2001
Country 2000 Country 2001
E.U. 3,665 E.U.1 3,665
U.S. 1,630 U.S. 2,798
Argentina 920 South America 932
New Zealand N/A New Zealand 163
Canada 60 Canada 60
Total 6,275 Total 7,618
1 Europe’s data are from 2000(a). No data were available for China.
Sources: Granatstein 2000, Granatstein and Kirby 2002.
Figure 3.2.  Production of Non-Bartlett Pears by State, 1987–2001 (tons)
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Argentina’s production is expected to increase in re-
sponse to a growing demand from Europe and the
U.S., Argentina’s two largest export markets.17 The two
estimates available for New Zealand organic pear acre-
age varied considerably: Granatstein (2002) reported
163 acres in 200118 and a Global Agriculture Informa-
tion Network (GAIN) report from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) identified 500 acres in 2000.19
The data sets for conventional and organic produc-
tion are not comparable because both production and
acreage data are available for conventional pears but
only acreage data are available for organics. Thus, com-
paring distribution by country for overall production
and organic production is impossible. Also, acreage
figures for pear production per country were not avail-
able, so the percentage of each country’s acreage that
is organic is unknown. However, it appears that the
countries that are important players in organic pear
production also have significant conventional opera-
tions.
U.S. Organic Production
Organic pear production was established fairly re-
cently in the U.S., in the 1980s, and developed quickly
during the 1990s. Organic acreage now represents
about 4.3 percent (2,298 acres in 2001) of total U.S.
pear plantings (Granatstein 2002).
The warm, dry climate of the West allows produc-
ers to grow organic fruit without major difficulty in
controlling pests. Washington, Oregon, and Califor-
nia combined represent about 95 percent of the U.S.’s
organic pear acreage, equivalent to their share of the
pear market as a whole (Table 3.2). Washington grows
the most organic pears in the nation, accounting for
more than one-third of U.S. acreage (about 808 in
2001), and about 38 percent of overall pear acreage
(Figure 3.3). California is second with 37 percent (842
acres) of total organic acres and 28 percent of domes-
tic production in 2001. Oregon, by contrast, has 22
percent of the country’s organic acres (assuming 500
17 Organic Perspectives, USDA FAS, March 2001.
18 Gaete, P. Ceroni. Estructura y Potential Exportador de la Industria Organica Chilena: Puntos Criticos para el Desarollo, Agrupacion de
Agricultura Organica de Chile A.G. – AAOCH Temuco, Enero 2002.
19 USDA FAS GAIN (Global Agriculture Information Network) Report, New Zealand Organic Products, Apple and Pears Organic
Industry, 2000.
Table 3.2.  Estimated U.S. Certified Organic Pear
Acreage – 1998, 2000, and 2001
    Number of Acres
State 1998 2000 2001
Washington 449 619 1,3081
California 800 N/A 842
Oregon 500 500 NA1
Colorado 87 115 100
New York — — 20
Wisconsin — — 16
Texas — — 12
1 Oregon’s acreage was included in Washington’s figure in 2001.
Sources: Granatstein, 2000a; Granatstein, 2000b; and Granatstein and Kirby, 2002.
acres in 2001) and 28 percent overall. Other states
producing organic pears are Colorado, New York, Wis-
consin, and Texas (148 acres collectively).
Figure 3.3.  Distribution of Acreage for All Pears and
for Organic Pears in the U.S., 2001
Sources: Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 2001—Summary, NASS, USDA, July 2002;
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Information on the distribution of
varieties for U.S. organic pear produc-
tion is not available, but Granatstein
(2002) presents specific information
on Washington organic pear varieties
that is discussed later.
Northwest Organic
Winter Pear Production
In Washington, organic pear pro-
duction got underway slowly at the
end of the 1980s. A sudden shift to
organic production in the apple sec-
tor after an Alar scare in the late 1980s
does not appear to have affected the
pear industry. Organic pear produc-
tion in Washington increased slightly
during the 1990s, and then more than
doubled from 2000 to 2001, expand-
ing from 619 to 1,319 acres (Figure
3.4). Some 382 of those acres were
reported as organic transitional in
2001, so Washington’s organic pear
production will likely increase during
the next few years. In contrast, con-
ventional pear acreage in Washington
remained relatively stable during the
same period.
Granatstein (2002) reported de-
tailed data on Washington organic
pear acreage, including information on
pear varieties. For 2001, he reported
937 acres of organic winter pears in
Washington, of which 576 acres (61
percent) were Anjou and 279 acres (30
percent) were Bosc. Organic red Anjou,
Concorde, and other varieties together
accounted for 82 acres (9 percent)(Figure 3.5).
Fifteen of the 70 or so handlers of winter pears in
Oregon and Washington ship organic pears (PBN). In
the 1990s, PBN reported about 35 organic growers
(28 to 30 in Washington and five or six in Oregon). A
more recent count has not been made. The nine han-
dlers interviewed reported between 72 and 78
producers of organic winter pears. This figure is an
overestimate, however, if some organic growers shipped
their pears to more than one handler. Taking into ac-
count the fact that six handlers did not answer the
survey, it seems that 80 is a good estimate of the num-
ber of organic pear growers in the northwest region.
The first estimate of organic winter pear produc-
tion in the northwest was reported in Good Fruit Grower
magazine in July 1998, at which time production was
Figure 3.4.  Evolution of Organic Pear Acreage in Washington,
1988–2001
Source: Current Trends in Organic Tree Fruit Production, David Granatstein
and Elizabeth Kirby, May 2002.















Figure 3.5.  Organic Pear Acreage by Variety, 2001
Source: Current Trends in Organic Tree Fruit Production, David Granatstein
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expected to be 106,000 boxes,
80 percent of it coming from
Washington.
PBN began collecting data
on the production of organic
pears in Washington and Or-
egon for the 2001–02 season,
when about 422,000 standard
boxes of organic winter pears
were produced, representing
2.7 percent of total winter pear
production in the northwest.
According to PBN, some small
growers may not have reported
their organic shipments and
there could have been as much
as 10 percent more organic
pears produced that year.
For the 2002–03 season,
PBN forecasts production of
organic winter pears to be
about 430,000 boxes, a 2
percent increase from the
previous year and about
2.9 percent of forecasted
production of winter pears
overall. In contrast, production
of fresh organic Bartlett
(summer) pears in the
northwest increased by 22
percent but still represents only
2.5 percent of the region’s total
fresh production of Bartletts
(Figure 3.6)(PBN).
The total organic acreage
of northwest winter pears can
be estimated from PBN’s
production numbers and
Granatstein’s acreage figure by
assuming that Oregon and
Washington obtain the same
yields. The result is 1,014 acres,
which may slightly overestimate actual organic acreage
since, for simplicity, Mid-Columbia acres were ascribed
entirely to Oregon when part of that region is actually
in Washington.
Northwest organic winter pear orchards raise a
higher proportion of Anjous and fewer Boscs than con-
ventional winter pear orchards do. PBN estimates that
81 percent of organic winter pears in 2002–03 will be
Figure 3.7.  Distribution of Northwest Winter Pear Production by Districts:
Organic vs. Total Production (2002–03 Estimates)













































Figure 3.6.  Production of Northwest Organic Pears in 2001–02 and 2002–03
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Anjous, which make up 74 percent of total produc-
tion (all pears). This is an increase from 2001–02,
when Anjous made up 74 percent of organic winter
pear production. PBN estimates that Bosc pears will
represent 16 percent of organic winter pear produc-
tion and 19 percent of total winter pear production in
2002–03. This is a decrease from the 21 percent share
they held in 2001–02. Red Anjous make up only 4
percent of organic winter pears and are less important
than in conventional systems, while the other winter
varieties (e.g., Comice and Seckle) are not organically
grown.
Six of the nine handlers reported that their organic
winter pear production has been increasing over time;
production for the other three has remained steady.
Seven handlers stated that total organic winter pear
production is increasing. The
other two, however, believe
production in the northwest
has reached market satura-
tion.
One of the shippers inter-
viewed gave personal
estimates of organic produc-
tion of Anjou and Bosc pears
in the northwest. He esti-
mated 125,000 boxes of
organic Anjous and 25,000
boxes of organic Boscs for
2000–01, the year before
PBN started tracking organic
production. Assuming that 4
percent of production is Red
Anjou, his estimate would
put total organic production
in 2000–01 at 156,250
boxes. His 2001–02 estimate
for organic pear production
was very close to PBN’s esti-
mate (92 percent of PBN’s
figure); his forecast for
2002–03 was about 15 per-
cent higher than PBN’s
forecast but still very close.
Organic northwest winter
pear production is heavily
concentrated in the Wenatchee region, which gener-
ated 92.4 percent. The Mid-Columbia region produces
only 4.2 percent of organic northwest winter pears.
Conventional northwest winter pears are more evenly
distributed; 41 percent come from Wenatchee and
38 percent from Mid-Columbia (Figure 3.7).
Cost of Production of
Organic vs. Conventional Pears
A study conducted in 1992 by Clark Seavert of
Washington University analyzed costs of production
for both conventional and organic Anjou pears in the
Hood River area. His results show that organic costs per
acre exceed conventional costs by $127 per acre
($3,447.17 compared to $3,320.06)(Table 3.3).
Table 3.3.  D’Anjou Pear Enterprise Budget for a Conventional and an Organic
Orchard in 1992, Economic Costs and Returns
Variable Costs ($ per acre) Conventional Organic
Fertilizer 62.78 30.40
Herbicide/biological weed control (organic) 77.11 47.50
Spray program (conventional: 7x; organic: 16x) 602.05 813.24
Mowing (conv: 4x; dandle mower, 2x) 23.67 18.26
Harvesting 532.16 475.89
Other variable costs 686.38 686.38
Interest: Operating capital 24.80 25.90
Total Variable Costs $2,008.95 $2,097.64
Fixed Costs Conventional Organic
Machinery, equipment, depreciation,
   interest, and housing 193.05 231.47
Other fixed costs 268.06 268.06
Land interest charge 350.00 350.00
Tree depreciation and interest 500.00 500.00
Total Fixed Costs $1,311.11 $1,349.53
Total All Costs $3,320.06 $3,447.17
Income Conventional Organic
Quantity (boxes) 723.18 393.38
$/Box 7.85 9.22
Gross Income $5,677.00 $3,628.58
Projected Net Revenues $2,356.94 $181.41
Source: Clark Seavert, Washington State University.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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Two-thirds of this cost increase is due to the machinery
and materials used in the organic spray program. Costs
for harvest labor are higher for conventional
production because conventional yields are higher and
harvest costs are calculated on a per-box basis. The
sales price per box of Anjous was $9.22 for organic
and $7.85 for conventional. Even with this premium
of $1.37 per box, the combination of a much lower
yield (393 boxes per acre for organic compared to
723 boxes per acre for conventional) and higher costs
of production resulted in organic production being
less profitable than conventional.
A more recent study conducted at Washington State
University by Glover et al. (2002) analyzed the first
six years of production of golden delicious apples
(1994–1999) in the Yakima Valley of Washington. This
study compared three production systems: conven-
tional, integrated, and organic. In years one, two, four,
and five, organic costs exceeded conventional costs.
In the sixth year, organic costs began decreasing and
dropped below conventional costs, which kept increas-
ing. Over the course of the six-year study, organic
production was more costly than conventional.
There was no harvest during the first two years.
Once harvesting began, the average yield was a little
higher for conventional than for organic production
(58.6 bins per acre compared to 54.9 bins per acre),
but the average bin value was considerably higher for
organic apples ($101.20 per bin compared to $69.80
per bin for conventional). As a result, organic produc-
tion was more profitable than conventional production
over the study period even though the organic yield
was very low the last year (1999). In addition, the au-
thors point out that there is a risk of increased pesticide
costs for conventional production in the next few years
due to government regulation of chemical applications.
They also note that growers who are not familiar with
organic production practices may incur higher pro-
duction costs until they learn to produce organic apples
efficiently.
Pear production is very similar to apple production.
The cultural operations are the same, except that pears
do not need to be thinned as apples do. Thinning must
be done partially by hand and therefore represents an
important cost for both organic and conventional apple
production. On average over the four years of the
study, the cost of thinning was $268.40 per acre for
organic production (4 percent of average total costs)
and $381.80 per acre for conventional production (5
percent of average total costs).
Other sources of information indicate that organic
production is more expensive than conventional pro-
duction. One of the nine handlers surveyed for this
study and organic growers interviewed by Good Fruit
Grower stated that organic pear and apple production
is more expensive than conventional production. Cliff
Parker, owner of a sizable organic pear operation in
the Wenatchee Valley (190 acres) was interviewed by
Good Fruit Grower in 1997. According to him, organic
pear production costs more because of labor-intensive
tasks such as mowing and additional wear and tear on
equipment because of the greater number of applica-
tions of products such as insecticidal soaps. Bob Brody,
an apple marketer from Wenatchee who was inter-
viewed in 1999, estimated that it is about 25 percent
more expensive to raise a quality organic apple crop
because chemical thinners, herbicides, and synthetic
fertilizers cannot be used.
Pear psylla is an insect pest that affects only pears.
According to David Granatstein, it is very expensive
to destroy pear psylla in organic orchards. He believes
production costs will decrease once a way is found to
fight psylla effectively using organic methods.20
Marketing
U.S. Pear Trade
Exports have become increasingly important for
U.S. pear producers: 18.3 percent of the 2001 U.S. pear
crop was exported, more than twice the 8.6 percent
exported in 1989 (USDA NASS and USDA ERS). The
percentage exported was higher for fresh pears: 33.8
percent of the 2001 U.S. fresh pear crop was shipped
to foreign markets, again more than twice the propor-
tion exported in 1989 (16.2 percent)(USDA ERS). Also,
37 percent of the 2000–01 northwest winter pear crop
was exported (PBN).
Canada and Mexico together received more than
three-quarters of U.S. pear exports. The U.S.
20 Personal conversation with D. Granatstein, July 2002.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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21 Good Fruit Grower, 1997.
traditionally captures about 70 percent of the Canadian
import market for fresh pears and has dominated
Mexican imports throughout the last decade, achieving
a market share of about 98 percent. This success is
partly due to NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) and to increased promotion activities
funded by USDA under the Market Access Program
(MAP)
In 2000, the northwest tree fruit industry succeeded
in eliminating pears from the Export Apple and Pear
Act. This act, passed in 1933, imposed minimum stan-
dards for exported pears. However, five amendments
in the 1990s had already allowed low-grade pears to
be shipped to developing countries. The exemption
of pears from this act could open new markets for
low-grade and low-price pears.
Seasonality of Marketing
Winter pears are available on the fresh market from
their harvest in September to about July of the follow-
ing year, with most sales occurring from November
through February. Storage technologies, however, are
extending the marketing season for all domestic pears.
Currently, pears generally can be kept in cold storage
for four to five months without damage and as long
as 12 months in ideal conditions. As a result, winter
pears, which already compete with Bartletts when their
seasons overlap in early fall, face continued competi-
tion from summer pears still in the fresh market into
December. In addition, imported fresh pears begin ar-
riving in February and peak in February and March,
creating a second wave of competition and lower prices
for domestic pears that were stored for late release. As
a consequence, domestic winter pears are almost never
alone on the fresh pear market, unlike Bartletts, which
appear on the fresh market in August when other pears
are no longer present. U.S. imports almost doubled
during the last decade and represented 20.6 percent of
U.S. pear consumption in 2000, compared to 13 per-
cent in 1990. This near doubling of U.S. imports in
concert with a simultaneous doubling of U.S. exports
signals the demand from consumers worldwide for a
year-round supply of pears.
 Winter Pear Consumption
Consumption of pears in the U.S. increased by 118
percent between 1970 and 1987, when it reached 854.7
million pounds (Figure 3.8)(USDA ERS). Eighty-five
percent of this increase came from an increase in per
capita consumption; the rest was due to population
increases. Since 1987, however, per capita consump-
tion has remained steady. The small increase in
consumption can be explained solely by population
growth. In 2000, Americans ate an average of 3.2 lbs
of pears and 17.4 lbs of apples. Italians during the
same period consumed 32 lbs of pears per capita.21
No data were available on consumption of organic
pears in the U.S. The handlers interviewed in this study
were split five to five over whether there is a large de-
mand for organic pears in this country. Two of the
handlers who believe there is large demand, however,
were pessimistic about the future. They anticipate a
much faster increase in production than in demand,
which will result in overproduction of organic pears
in the next few years.
One handler stated that customers who buy organic
products care more about the way they were produced
and prefer organic and local retail outlets over large
supermarkets. According to another handler, consump-
tion of organic products is higher in segments of the
population for whom food safety is an issue, particu-
larly parents of young children. A third handler noted
that these shoppers also are more socially and envi-
ronmentally conscious and more affluent.
Post-Harvest Handling, Grades, and Standards
As mentioned previously, winter pear varieties are
picked in the fall (from August through October) and
Bartletts are harvested in late July and August. Pears
are harvested by hand when the fruit is fully mature
but not ripe; pears that ripen on the tree lose much of
their flavor and the flesh becomes “gritty.” Cross-polli-
nation is required for most varieties, and producers
generally mix varieties in their orchards.
From August through September, orchard bins full
of winter pears are delivered to packing houses, where
the pears are immediately cooled to slow the ripeningGiannini Foundation Research Report 346
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process. They then are placed on water transport
conveyors to prevent bruising and are sorted and
separated by size and grade before being packed.
There are three principal USDA grades for winter
pears: U.S. Extra No. 1, U.S. No. 1, and U.S. No. 2 in
descending order. Defining characteristics are maturity,
cleanness, shape, and absence of damage. The level of
tolerance in the attribution of grades for a given lot is
usually 10 percent. Any damage developed after stor-
age or transit does not affect the grade.
The winter pear marketing order does not require
adherence to USDA standards, but most handlers use
them. Washington and Oregon have additional state
standards. Oregon’s standards (Extra Fancy, Fancy, and
Commercial) are equivalent to the U.S. Extra No. 1,
U.S. No. 1, and U.S. Combination grades.
Washington’s standards (Extra Fancy, Fancy, Fancy
Select, and Fancy No. 2), on the other hand, are
somewhat more stringent than corresponding federal
standards. Handlers can grade Washington fruit
according to U.S. standards or Washington standards.
Pears that do not make grade are sold for processing
(primarily for juice).
Pears are packed into plastic-lined cartons after hav-
ing been individually hand-wrapped or placed in fitted
trays. The standard box of four-fifths of a bushel (about
44 lbs and 18 inches long, 11.5 inches wide, and 8.5
inches deep) is the most popular for winter pears.
The Euro box, a carton with a metric footprint based
on dimensions of 40 cm by 60 cm, is the package
typically used by European pear handlers. Some large
U.S. retailers now demand the Euro box instead of the
larger U.S. standard box as they push for a standard
footprint for all produce. The Euro box has only one
Figure 3.8.  Consumption of Fresh Pears in the U.S., 1970–2000
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or two layers and can be put
directly on display without
unpacking. PBN believes that
adoption of the Euro box by
the U.S. pear industry would
facilitate exports.
Packed pears are then held
in cold storage until they can
be sold on the fresh market.
Controlled atmosphere stor-
age helps increase the life of the
fruit. After cold storage, most
winter varieties must be kept
for a time (at least four to eight
days) in a warm moist area so
they begin to ripen. Ripening
can be done by the retailer or
by consumers if the retailer
sells the fruit directly from cold storage. In the U.S.
domestic market, pears generally are not ripened be-
fore being sold to consumers. However, several studies
conducted by PBN note that most U.S. consumers buy
pears on impulse. They want ripe fruit and dislike wait-
ing six to ten days for a pear to ripen. In addition,
at-home ripening is hard to do well because winter
pears generally do not change color when they ripen.
Winter Pear Prices
Various factors play a role in determining the price
of Anjou pears, which represent three-quarters of win-
ter pear production: fruit quality, overall demand for
pears, the quantity and price of competing pears, and
time of year.
On average, prices for winter pears are higher than
prices for Bartletts (an average of $355 per ton for
fresh winter pears versus $326 per ton for Bartletts for
1987 through 2001). However, winter pear prices fluc-
tuate considerably from one year to another based on
variations in production. In the past 15 years, for ex-
ample, prices have ranged from a low of $251 per ton
in 1987 to a high of $522 per ton in 1996 (Figure 3.9)
without any discernible trend.
For the past few years, many conventional pear
producers have found that their revenues are not
adequate to cover rising production costs. Gutman
(2000) found that the winter pear industry enjoyed
economic profits prior to 1998, when producers faced
little competition in the fresh market from imports
and domestic Bartletts. Demand for winter pears was
high because they were the only pears available.
Competition from imports and other varieties has
increased tremendously since the end of the 90s,
however, leaving less room for the winter pear industry
to realize higher seasonal prices. Since the last half of
the 1999 season, returns have been below the cost of
production22 for many growers.
Additional pressure on prices came from increased
production of northwest winter pears in 2000 and
2001. Production and competition combined to
reduce the average per-ton price for domestic winter
pears from $433 in 1999 to $325 in 2000 and $332
in 2001. The 2001 price is particularly notable because
it remained low despite a drop in imports and a decline
in the share of Bartletts sold on the fresh market. The
Washington Pear Growers Association, a statewide
cooperative, was created in March 2001 to improve
returns through higher prices, thereby addressing
growers’ concerns that the pear industry could become
as weak economically as the apple industry has
become.
22 Good Fruit Grower, 2001.
Figure 3.9.  Production and Price of Non-Bartlett Pears in the U.S., 1987–2001
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U.S. Organic Pear Trade
According to Kevin Moffitt (president of PBN), the
countries exporting the largest quantities of conven-
tional pears to the U.S. (Argentina, Chile, New Zealand,
and South Africa) also send organic pears to the U.S.
fresh market.
A report from PBN dated June 21, 2002, stated that
96 percent of northwest organic winter pears from
2001–02 had been sold and only 4 percent remained
in storage. Seventy-six percent were sold on the do-
mestic market and 24 percent were exported. Thirteen
percent were shipped offshore, 6.6 percent were sold
to Mexico, and 3.8 percent were sent to Canada.
A larger share of conventional northwest winter
pears are exported (37 percent of winter pears overall
versus 24 percent of organics). More than half of ex-
ported organic winter pears are shipped offshore,
compared with only 13 percent of all winter pear ex-
ports (Figure 3.10). The United Kingdom is the largest
export market for organic northwest winter pears
(Kevin Moffitt, PBN).
A majority of the organic shippers interviewed (six
out of nine) export organic winter pears. The
proportion of each handler’s pack that is exported varies




Five of the nine handlers interviewed
sell to large chains and specialty stores.
Only one of those also sells some pears
at a farmers market. Three of the five
shippers sell organic winter pears to
large chains, specialty stores, wholesal-
ers, and brokers. The other two sell only
to large chains and wholesalers. The
largest part of the organic winter pear
crop goes to chain grocery stores (some
of which specialize in organic com-
modities).
Three of the handlers contract with
their buyers (processors or distribu-
tors), which provides a guaranteed price
for the handler and a stable supply for
the buyer. One of the handlers is planning to form a
special partnership with a large supermarket chain
through which the handler will guarantee daily ship-
ments of a specified amount of organic apples and
pears to the stores in return for a guaranteed special
in-store display and constant price for his fruit. Part of
the profits will be donated to a foundation that serves
underperforming school children.
Post-Harvest Handling
of Organic Winter Pears
All the organic handlers who were surveyed sort
their fruit according to USDA standards. Organic win-
ter pears that do not meet the standards are either
processed at the handlers’ facilities or sold to organic
processors to make organic fruit juice and baby food.
Handlers were divided over whether additional indus-
try-wide minimum quality standards would help them
market their organic fruit. One of the handlers empha-
sized the necessity of applying Washington’s pear
standards, which are more stringent than the USDA’s,
to all winter pears. Another shipper noted that organic
pears need to be better differentiated from conventional
pears at the consumer level by, for example, educating
consumers about organic standards.
Figure 3.10. Distribution of Winter Pear Exports, 2001–02
Source: Season Summary, Statistical Annual Report 2000–2001, Winter Pear Control Committee;
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According to most of the organic handlers inter-
viewed for this study, packaging is the same for
conventional and organic pears. Half of our sample
use both standard (four-fifths of a bushel) and half
standard (two-fifths of a bushel) boxes. The other half
use only standard boxes. Half of the handlers have
kept the same mix of containers over time, but two
have recently started using the Euro box and modi-
fied-atmosphere bags.23 One handler stated that
packaging of organic pears is strongly driven by con-
sumers and that the retail industry needs to properly
identify organic fruit. Another handler reported a trend
towards plastic clamshell boxes containing only four
or five organic pears.
The custom packing charge (the fee charged to the
grower for packing their fruit from bins into boxes)
seems to be the rule for organic handlers. Five handlers
reported their packing charges, which ranged from
$5.50 to $9.00 per standard box, depending on the
packout (percentage of the fruit delivered that is
saleable and does not have to be culled out). The larger
the packout, the lower the charge per box. A third of
the organic handlers interviewed stated that the charge
has been increasing in recent years, and two predicted
that the charge will continue to increase in the future.
A majority of the handlers (six) reported that their
packing charges are the same for conventional and
organic pears. Two handlers said that their charge is
higher for organic pears because the quality
requirement is higher and the volume of the typical
organic pack is smaller.
Organic Winter Pear Prices
Granatstein (2002) reported organic pear prices
from the Washington Grower’s Clearinghouse Asso-
ciation, which began collecting price data in 1996,
offering an idea of general price trends for organic pears
in that state. In the 1990s, prices for organic pears
were high. Organic Anjous and Boscs sold for more
than double the conventional price—about $39 per box
for organic Anjous and $18 per box for conventional.
Organic Boscs sold for about $41 per box, compared
to about $18 per box for conventional (Figures 3.11
and 3.12). Since then, both conventional and organic
prices have decreased, as has the organic premium. In
2000, organic Anjous still sold for twice the conven-
tional price, which was considerably lower (about $25
per box of organic and $13 per box of conventional).
Thus, the premium was reduced from $20 per box in
1996 to about $12 in 2000.
The handler interviews revealed much lower
price premiums than those in
Granatstein’s study. Six of the nine
surveyed handlers confirmed the ex-
istence of a premium for organic
pears. According to three of them,
the organic price is 20 to 25 per-
cent higher than the conventional
price. Another described premiums
ranging from $4 to $8 on organic
Anjous selling for $14 to $20 per
box and on organic Boscs selling
for $20 to $25 per box. One han-
dler reported a very small premium
of $1 per box.
Two of the other three handlers
in the study did not mention the ex-
istence of a premium and the third
sold his organic pears in 2001 for
23 Modified Atmosphere Packaging (MAP):  Modified atmosphere bags (polyethylene liners) are used inside pear cartons (four fruit
per bag) to control atmosphere conditions instead of subjecting the container to controlled atmosphere storage. MAP can extend
storage life.
Figure 3.11.  Comparison of Prices for Conventional and Organic Pears,
1996–2000, Washington d’Anjou Pears
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less than the conventional price. He mentioned prices
as low as $10 per box for organic Anjous and $17 per
box for organic Boscs.
Overall, handlers were pessimistic about the future
of organic pear prices. Half of the sample (five han-
dlers) said that the organic price has decreased in recent
years and that it is approaching the conventional price.
In three of these cases, the handler attributed the price
decrease to overproduction. The other five handlers
believe that organic prices rise and fall with conven-
tional prices. One of them added that in the past
organic and conventional prices were not related but
that the situation has changed. Another handler men-
tioned that when the conventional price decreases it
becomes difficult to sell organic pears without decreas-
ing their price as well. Similarly, when the conventional
price increases, the organic price also increases.
Only one handler reported prices for organic and
conventional pears as having distinct trends. Accord-
ing to him, the price in both instances is based on
supply and demand but the conventional price varies
more during the season than the organic price does.
The same handler has noticed that organic prices are
stronger at the beginning and at the end of the winter
pear marketing season and weaker in October and No-
vember.
Four of the handlers have sold some organic pears
as conventional. From their responses, it seems that
small and low-grade organic winter pears are most
likely to be sold to conventional markets. PBN con-
firmed that some organic winter pears were sold as
conventional in 2001–02.
Federal Marketing Order
for Northwest Winter Pears
Grades, Sizes, and Quality
The winter pear marketing order authorized grade,
size, and quality regulations for fresh winter pears. Size
and grade regulations have been used in the past, but
they were suspended in 1979. Since then, the market-
ing order committee has made only recommendations
on maturity (temperature and pressure before ship-
ping). In 2000, however, winter pear growers voted to
include a new federal rule in the marketing order. This
rule requires Anjou pears shipped to North America
(continental U.S., Canada, and Mexico) between Au-
gust 15 and November 1 of each year to be certified
by the federal-state inspection service as having a core/
pulp temperature lowered to 35 degrees Fahrenheit or
less and an average pressure test of 14 pounds or less.
The objective of this rule is to improve ripening of
winter pears.
Proposed rules were recently submitted to pear pro-
ducers to authorize WPCC to recommend maturity
regulations and container or marking requirements.
The referendum was conducted among winter pear pro-
ducers between July 17 and August
2, 2002. According to results pub-
lished October 7, 2002, on the
USDA Agricultural Marketing Ser-
vice Web site, the two amendments
failed to receive the two-thirds ap-
proval necessary to pass.
Research and Promotion
The federal marketing order
for pears also authorizes
production research, marketing
research, market development,
and promotion activities. These
programs are currently active.
Promotion and marketing activities
are contracted to PBN, which
Figure 3.12.  Comparison of Prices for Conventional and Organic Pears,
1996–2000, Washington State Bosc Pears
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conducts advertising campaigns and consumer
research. WPCC’s research committee handles
production research.
WPCC’s assessments on winter pears are paid by
producers and collected from handlers based on the
volume of winter pears sold. Until the 1980s,
assessments were voluntary. An industry referendum
in the 1980s made them mandatory. Since the 1998–
99 marketing year, the assessment has been 49 cents
per standard box (four-fifths of a bushel, 40 to 45
lbs). This is one of the nation’s highest assessments
on a tree fruit. Two cents go to research projects and
44 cents to PBN for promotion of fresh winter pears.
The remaining three cents per box pay for
administrative expenses. Recently, a three-cent increase
was approved by WPCC to fund a research project on
ethoxyquin residue on stored Anjous. Since this
pesticide is not used in organic production, organic
growers are exempt from the fee. Thus the total
assessment for conventional Anjous is now 52 cents
per box.
The 2002 Farm Bill exempts persons who market
solely 100 percent certified organic products from any
portion of marketing order assessments that goes to
commodity promotion. On December 1, 2003, USDA
proposed an amendment to the northwest winter pear
marketing order to implement this exemption.
Fresh winter pears promoted by PBN are under
the “USA Pear” label, while fresh Bartlett pears are pro-
moted under both the “USA Pear” logo and the
“Northwest Bartletts” logo.
For decades, PBN has focused its efforts on
educating consumers about how to ripen pears at
home. More recent research projects have been focused
on providing retailers with ready-to-eat pears by way
of ethylene preconditioning, which reduces ripening
time for consumers to three or four days. However,
the risk of damaging fruit that has been preconditioned
is greater, so more care must be taken in handling and
shipping the nearly ripe fruit. In New Zealand, research
is being conducted on new varieties of pears that
consumers could eat at the time of purchase or after a
Table 3.4.  Winter Pear Control Committee Funding (February 5, 2002)
2002 Use for Organic
WPCC Funding Winter Production
Projects for Enhancing Product Quality
Epidemiology of Bulls Eye Rot in Pears $34,149 Yes
Post-Harvest Physiology of Winter Pears $40,000 Yes
Storage Decay Controls $20,000 No
Control of Decay in Pears $38,044 No
Management of Pear Fruit Ripening (MCP) $26,546 No
Phacidiopycnis Rot of Pears $12,780 Yes
Biology of Pear Pests $30,050 Yes
Integrated Fire Blight Management $16,100 No
Chemical Ecology of Pear Psylla $20,230 Yes
Biochemical Approach for Estimating
   Psylla Predation $28,600 Yes
Other
Pear Varieties Testing $6,000 Yes
Pear Phytonutrients $25,000 Yes
Source: Pear Bureau Northwest and George Ing (chairman of WPCC’s research subcommittee).Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
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short ripening period at room temperature.24 These
varieties result from crossbreeding between European
and Asiatic pears.
The winter pear marketing order has funded re-
search projects for about 30 years. The two cents per
box that pays for these projects represent 4 percent of
the total assessment—about $300,000 annually in re-
cent years. According to George Ing, chairman of
WPCC’s research subcommittee and a pear grower in
the Hood River area, “organic growers have been ex-
pressing their research interests to WPCC for perhaps
ten years.” None of the research projects explicitly ad-
dress organic production, but most of them benefit
both conventional and organic growers (Table 3.4).
WPCC funds research in two categories: enhancing
product quality and plant protection. In the first
category, the six projects currently under way address
improving the quality of fruit during storage. Three of
the projects help both organic and conventional pear
producers—a study of bulls eye rot, a disease that
causes fruit loss, and of orchard practices that could
reduce it; a study on the effect of various atmospheres
on the storage life of pears; and a study of Phacidiopycnis
rot. Three of the four plant-protection projects benefit
both organic and conventional production. Topics
include the biology of pear pests (mostly pear psylla)
and the potential for predators as non-chemical control
agents; the chemical ecology of pear psylla; and psylla
predation. Two additional projects relate to both
organic and conventional winter pears. A study on
imported pear varieties is testing their suitability for
cultivation in the northwest and their resistance to
diseases and other pests. The last project relates to pear
phytonutrients and their potential benefits for
human health.
The contribution of organic growers to the research
projects is about $8,500—2.8 percent of the total re-
search fund. In contrast, projects that are potentially
useful for the organic pear industry represent
$186,809—two-thirds of the total research fund
($283,599 in 2002). Thus, organic growers receive a
large benefit from the assessment for research. George
Ing added that organic growers “have had praise for
the WPCC research program and have not criticized
any aspect of it.”
Organic Market Promotion
WPCC recently introduced a definition of “organi-
cally produced pears” into the rules and regulations
defining the marketing order for winter pears. Two
percent of all of the money collected through assess-
ments is used to promote organic pears. PBN joined
the Organic Trade Association in 2002 and regularly
conducts marketing campaigns for organic pears, both
domestically and internationally (e.g., in the United
Kingdom, Mexico, and Asia). For U.S. promotion, most
of the budget for organic pears is dedicated to generic
advertising and in-store sampling. PBN works mainly
with Whole Foods and Wild Oats, two large natural
food store chains, but also tries to reach smaller retail-
ers across the country. At the international level, PBN
is involved in trade advertisements, organic trade
shows, and retail promotion, primarily in the United
Kingdom but also in Germany. Overall, organic pears
are promoted much like conventional ones. The em-
phasis is on the nutritive and taste qualities of the fruit
and the proper way to ripen pears after purchase.
Organic Handlers’ Views
of the Winter Pear Marketing Order
Overall, the organic handlers who participated in the
study were not very enthusiastic about PBN’s promo-
tion activities. Six of the nine handlers believe that the
advertising and promotion programs are somehow
helpful but remain skeptical about them. To improve
the advertising programs, two of the handlers suggested
complete separation between organic and conventional
promotions. They insist that it is essential to promote
organic pears on the basis of their positive impact on
the environment. One handler also suggested improv-
ing the advance notice provided to organic shippers
for upcoming promotions. Another advocated estab-
lishing a minimum price, a step that falls outside the
authority of the marketing order. A handler pointed
out that PBN is new to the organic market, so its pro-
motion efforts will likely improve over time.
Most of the handlers in this study (seven out of
nine) do not do any direct advertising, implying that
they do not see an advantage to advertising in general.
24 Good Fruit Grower, July 2000.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
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If true, this explains their lukewarm attitude toward
PBN’s marketing program.
Two-thirds of the handlers had a positive view of
WPCC’s production research projects. One handler
expressed appreciation for the environmentally friendly
nature of the projects. Still, handlers generally felt that
the ranking of research priorities at WPCC is based
on the needs of conventional growers.
Organic Growers’ Views
of the Winter Pear Marketing Order
In the early 1990s WPCC formed a subcommittee on
organic pears charged with preparing recommenda-
tions to WPCC regarding the interests of organic
growers and handlers. The subcommittee reviewed the
order’s marketing and research programs, comparing
the benefits derived by the organic pear industry to
the assessments paid by organic growers. The subcom-
mittee also considered whether sending the funds
provided by organic producers elsewhere would be
more effective and the potential value of forming an
organic commission. In 1998, organic producers took
a vote and 85 percent chose to stay with the WPCC
marketing order.
There was regional disagreement, however. A few
organic growers in Oregon wanted to be exempted
while the more numerous Washington growers wanted
to stay in the program. WPCC does not have the
authority to exempt only Oregon organic growers
because the production area is defined as pears in
Oregon and Washington. There is no provision in the
marketing order allowing individual states or regions
to be treated differently; WPCC can exempt all or
exempt none. Consequently, the Oregon growers’
request for exemption could not be considered.
The 2002 Farm Bill includes a section that exempts
certified organic products from commodity promo-
tion assessments. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has
not yet issued regulations governing eligibility and
compliance for an exemption, but according to the
bill “A person that produces and markets solely 100
percent organic products, and that does not produce
any conventional or non organic products, shall be
exempt from the payment of an assessment under a
commodity promotion law with respect to any agri-
cultural commodity that is produced on a certified
organic farm.” On December 1, 2003, USDA proposed
amendments to 28 fruit and vegetable marketing or-
der programs that authorize market promotion
activities. The marketing orders for northwest winter
pears and California almonds are among the programs
affected.
This study suggests that many organic producers
would opt out of the assessment if allowed by the
2002 Farm Bill. One handler pointed out that Oregon
growers are more likely to oppose the assessment than
Washington growers. However, another handler stated
his belief that the organic winter pear industry needs
the marketing order efforts because the financial sup-
port it receives from all producers makes it more
capable than individuals of promoting organic winter
pears.
At the beginning of 2002, a group of 20 organic
apple growers expressed their desire to opt out of the
Washington Apple Commission and join a commod-
ity commission representing all organic foods grown
in the state.25 Washington state legislators failed to act
on a bill that would have allowed an organic foods
commission to be formed but instructed the State
Department of Agriculture to study the feasibility of
such a plan. Of the 540 organic food producers in the
state of Washington, 197 produce tree fruit. An addi-
tional 43 conventional producers are making the
transition to organic. The Washington State Depart-
ment of Agriculture has sent surveys to the state’s
organic growers to obtain their opinions.
25 Good Fruit Grower, 2002.Giannini Foundation Research Report 346
66
References
Ames, G., and H. Born. Organic Pear Production: Horti-
culture Production Guide. Butte, MT: Appropriate
Technology Transfer for Rural Area Guide (ATTRA),
2000. Available online at www.attra.org/attra-pub/
PDF/pear.pdf, 2002.
Granatstein, D. Trends in Organic Tree Fruit Production
in Washington State: 1988–1998. Wenatchee, WA:
Washington State University Center for Sustain-
ing Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2000(a).
Granatstein, D. Trends in Organic Tree Fruit Production.
Wenatchee, WA: Washington State University Cen-
ter for Sustaining Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 2000(b).
Granatstein, D., and E. Kirby. Current Trends in Organic
Tree Fruit Production. Wenatchee, WA: Washington
State University Center for Sustaining Agriculture
and Natural Resources, 2002.
Agricultural Marketing Service. “Winter Pears Grown
in Oregon and Washington.” Code of Federal Regu-
lations, Chapter IX, Part 927. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 2001.
Gaete, P. C. Estructura y Potential Exportador de la In-
dustria Organica Chilena: Puntos Criticos para el
Desarollo, Agrupacion de Agricultura Organica de
Chile A.G. – AAOCH Temuco, Enero 2002.
Glover, J., H. Hinman, J. Reganold, and P. Andrews. A
Cost of Production Analysis of Conventional vs. Inte-
grated vs. Organic Apple Production Systems.
Wenatchee, WA: Washington State University Ag-
ricultural Research Center, 2002.
Good Fruit Grower. “Most Organic Pears are Grown in
the Okanogan,” August 1997, p. 7. Available online
at www.goodfruit.com, 2002.
———. “World Pear Production Dominated by China.”
October 1997, p. 37. Available online at
www.goodfruit.com, 2002.
———. “Oregon Organic Pear Growers Want Out.” July
1998, p. 23. Available online at www.goodfruit.com,
2002.
———. “Organic Produce Appeals to a New Generation.”
January 1999, p. 21. Available online at
www.goodfruit.com, 2002.
———. “In Search of a Pear that Needs No Ripening.”
July 2000, p. 11. Available online at
www.goodfruit.com, 2002.
———. “Pear Cooperative Formed in Washington State.”
April 2001, p. 24. Available online at
www.goodfruit.com, 2002.
———. “Should an Organic Commission Be Formed?”
/“Organic Commission to be Explored.” April
2002, p. 24. Available online at www.goodfruit.com,
2002.
Gutman, P.E. “Demand, Risk and Market Power in the
Northwest d’Anjou Pear Industry.” Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, Washington State University, 2000.
Pear Bureau Northwest. Final Organic Crop Report No.
6. Milwaukie, OR, June 2002.
Seavert, C. “D’Anjou Pear Enterprise Budget for a Con-
ventional and an Organic Orchard in 1992.”
Unpublished data. Washington State University,
1992.
Steward, P. “Smaller NW Fresh Pear Crop on Hori-
zon.” Capital Press, June 28, 2002.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Market-
ing Service. Northern Hemisphere Pear Situation and
Outlook, various issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service. Fruit and Nuts Situation and Outlook, vari-
ous issues.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service. Argentina Organic Products: Apples, Pears
and Cherries, 2000. Global Agriculture Information
Network) Report, 2000.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service. New Zealand Organic Products, Apple and
Pears Organic Industry, 2000. Global Agriculture In-
formation Network) Report, 2000.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service. Organic Perspectives. Washington, DC,
March 2001. (www.fas.usda.gov/agx/organics/2001/
march01.htm)
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service. World Horticultural Trade and Export
Opportunities. Washington, DC, 2001.
(www.fas.usda.gov/htp/circular/2001/01-11/toc.htm)
U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural
Statistics Service Agricultural Statistics Board.
Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts—Summary, various issues.
Winter Pear Control Committee. Statistical Annual
Report 2000–2001. Milwaukie, OR, 2001.Marketing Order Impact on the Organic Sector: Almonds, Kiwifruit and Winter Pears
67
Table 3.A1.  Estimates of Organic Winter Pears, 2002–03 Season, in Standard Box Equivalents1
Anjou Bosc Comice Red Anjou Total
Medford 0 0 0 0 0
Mid-Columbia 8,000 6,000 1,000 3,000 18,000
Wenatchee 333,150 56,000 0 7,500 396,650
Yakima 8,000 6,000 0 700 14,700
Total 349,150 68,000 1,000 11,200 429,350
1 On average: 44 lbs/box.
Source: Pear Bureau Northwest.
Table 3.A2.  Final 2001 Organic Crop Report No. 6 as of June 21, 2002 (standard box equivalent1)
Total
Red Anjou, Winter    Red
Anjou Bosc Comice Seckle Red Winter Pears Bartlett Bartlett
Packout
Total Projected Packout 314,164 89,882 1,504 603 16,114 422,267 49,508 9,770
Packout to Date 314,164 89,882 1,504 603 16,114 422,267 49,508 9,770
Controlled Atmosphere
(included in above) 150,725 31,596 0 0 2,194 184,515 6,492 0
Shipped
Offshore 47,450 5,492 0 0 391 53,333 3,157 0
Canada 10,794 4,171 0 0 457 15,422 2,478 504
Mexico 25,664 1,005 0 0 0 26,669 0 0
Domestic 217,753 49,160 1,504 603 11,162 310,182 43,873 9,266
Total Shipped 301,661 89,828 1,504 603 12,010 405,606 49,508 9,770
CA Shipped
(included in above) 120,093 31,421 0 0 2,107 153,621 6,492 0
Total Percent Shipped 96.0% 99.9% 0.0% 0.0% 74.5% 96.1% 100.0% 100.0%
Total Available2 12,503 54 0 0 4,104 16,661 0 0
1 On average: 44 lbs/box.
2 Total Available = Packout – Total Shipped.
Source: Pear Bureau Northwest.
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Table 3.A3.  Price Trends for Organic Pears in Washington ($/box FOB)
Variety in $ Per Standard Box1 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
d’Anjou
Conventional 18.07 13.32 14.05 13.91 12.57
Organic 38.67 24.50 30.20 25.73 24.64
Premium 20.60 11.18 16.15 11.82 12.07
Bosc
Conventional 18.16 13.69 28.25 16.54 15.80
Organic 41.04 41.48 37.57 34.73 24.81
Premium 22.88 27.79 9.32 18.19 9.01
1 On average: 44 lbs/box.
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